Processual SEMOMAP : an application and evaluation of the accident investigation model in passenger ship accidents by Singh, Yogender
World Maritime University
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World
Maritime University
World Maritime University Dissertations Dissertations
2014
Processual SEMOMAP : an application and
evaluation of the accident investigation model in
passenger ship accidents
Yogender Singh
World Maritime University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations
Part of the Emergency and Disaster Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-commercial, fair use academic
purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express written permission from the World Maritime University. For more
information, please contact library@wmu.se.
Recommended Citation
Singh, Yogender, "Processual SEMOMAP : an application and evaluation of the accident investigation model in passenger ship
accidents" (2014). World Maritime University Dissertations. 477.
http://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/477
i 
 
WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY 
Malmö, Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCESSUAL SEMOMAP: 
 An application and evaluation of the accident investigation model  
in passenger ship accidents 
 
By 
 
YOGENDER SINGH 
India 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial  
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
In 
MARITIME AFFAIRS 
 
 
(MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION) 
 
 
2014 
 
Copyright Yogender Singh, 2014 
 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been 
identifies, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been 
conferred on me. 
 
The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not necessarily 
endorsed by the University. 
 
 
 
(Signature): ………………………………… 
 
 
(Date):         .……………………………..…. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervised by: Dr. Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs 
World Maritime University 
 
 
Assessor: 
Institution/organisation: 
 
 
Co-assessor: 
Institution/organisation: 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
At the very outset, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Jens-Uwe Schröder-
Hinrichs for his guidance and support that enabled me to successfully undertake my 
dissertation. I am grateful for his mentoring and encouragement that helped me to 
accomplish my research project. His vision, time and effort in supervising me are 
highly appreciated. 
 
I am also grateful to Raza Mehdi of the MaRiSa research group in particular, for his 
support at each stage of the project. He ensured that I had the necessary input and tools 
to keep the project moving ahead.  
 
I would like to thank the faculty at the World Maritime University who contributed to 
my learning and development over the course of the year. 
 
I am thankful to the staff of the World Maritime University, particularly the library 
staff for their support in procuring literature for my dissertation. 
 
I am thankful to the World Maritime University for the facilities made available to me 
that made it possible for me to complete my dissertation. 
 
Several individuals have contributed to the success of this dissertation. I 
wholeheartedly thank them all and acknowledge that I alone and responsible for any 
shortcomings of the dissertation. 
 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family for their support and 
encouragement. 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Processual SEMOMAP: An application and evaluation 
of the accident investigation model in passenger ship 
accidents 
 
Degree:    MSc 
 
 
This dissertation is an exploratory application and evaluation of the SEquential MOdel 
of the Maritime Accident Process (SEMOMAP) accident investigation model. 
SEMOMAP is uniquely positioned in the academic literature by virtue of its focus on 
the accident process. The dissertation aims to reveal insights into why some unfolding 
processes help the system to achieve a safe operative state, while others lead to a 
mitigated or total loss. 
  
Fifteen publicly available accident investigation reports from Maritime 
Administrations and investigating bodies are analysed utilising the SEMOMAP. The 
accident investigation reports are coded with the help of two taxonomies – Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification Systems (HFACS) and a taxonomy inspired by the 
Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors 
(TRACEr). These taxonomies complement the SEMOMAP and provide a 
comprehensive perspective to accident investigation. 
 
The fifteen reports selected for analysis are of passenger vessel accidents that have 
taken place after the introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) code 
in 1998 presuming the existence of a functional Safety Management System (SMS) 
ashore and on-board to ensure compliance with the code, including compliance with 
the Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping (STCW).   
 
The accident reports are examined and the analysis helps to evaluate the SEMOMAP 
model and its performance. The analysis subjects the model to rigorous analytic 
evaluation. The purpose of the dissertation is twofold – on the one hand are the results 
of the analysis obtained after applying the model and on the other is the evaluation of 
the model itself, highlighting its strengths, weaknesses and unique contribution. 
 
The results are collated and discussed in the penultimate chapter (number 5); 
conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made in the final chapter 6. The 
dissertation argues that SEMOMAP with its complementary HFACS and TRACEr 
inspired taxonomies contributes to an enhanced and comprehensive understanding of 
the accident processes. The insights from applying the model make a valuable input 
for system resilience. 
 
KEYWORDS: SEMOMAP, Accident investigation models, HFACS, TRACEr, IMO 
casualty investigation 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
Declaration……………………………………………………………………ii 
 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………..iii 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………iv 
 
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………..v-vi 
 
List of Tables………………………………………………………….……..vii 
 
List of Figures……………………………………………………………....viii 
 
List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………ix 
 
1 Introduction…………………………………………………………1-9 
 1.1 Background……………………………………………………..1-7 
1.2 Aim, purpose and motivation for the dissertation……………....7-8 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation……………………………………..8-9 
 
2 Accident Causation Models – a Literature Review………………10-19 
 2.1 Sequential, epidemiological and systemic models…………...11-15 
  2.2 Evaluation of sequential, epidemiological and systemic models: 
     advantages and disadvantages ………………………………..16-17 
2.3 Maritime specific models……………………………………….17 
2.4 Taxonomy for coding data……………………………………...18 
2.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………..18-19 
 
3 Research Methodology…………………………………………...20-35 
vi 
 
3.1 Research methodology and sample selection………………….20-21 
3.2 SEMOMAP……………………………………………………21-26 
3.3 SEMOMAP taxonomy………………………………………...26-34 
3.4 Conclusions……………………………………………………….35 
 
4 Analysis of Accident Investigation Reports…………………….........36-83 
4.1 SEMOMAP solved case study example……………………....36-44 
4.2 Dissertation results…………………………………………….45-73 
4.3 Overview of the results of all 3 categories – flooding,  
grounding and fire……………………………………………..74-83 
4.4 Summary.………………………………………………………....83  
 
5 Reflection on Results……………………………………………..84-90 
 5.1 Reflection on SEMOMAP…………………………………....84-85 
 5.2 Reflection on Results and Research Questions………………86-90 
 5.3 Summary……………………………………………………........90 
 
6 Conclusions………………………………………………………91-92 
 
7 Appendices………………………………………………………93-153 
Appendix 1 Detail list of accident investigation reports……93-100 
Appendix 2 SEMOMAP code book……………………….101-153 
8          References……………………………………………………...154-157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Subjects affected by influencing factors (applicable to phase 0)………………26 
Table 2: SEMOMAP Taxonomy phase 0; factors leading to the dangerous  
               situation; adapted HFACS……………………………………………………...27 
Table 3: ‘Risk of’ incident; taxonomy table 1.1 Applicable to phase 1……………….. .28 
Table 4: Breakdown of accident investigation reports analyzed………………………..36 
Table 5: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 0’ HFACS………………….……………..……...38 
Table 6: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.1)….…39 
Table 7: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.2, 1.3)..39 
Table 8: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.1)….…40 
Table 9: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.2, 2.3)..41 
Table 10: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 3’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy  
table 3.2, 3.3)…….........................................................................................................42-43 
Table 11: List of accident investigation reports analyzed……………………………….45 
Table 12: List of accident investigation reports analyzed……………………………….46 
Table 13: Flooding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS overview ……………..……...47 
Table 14: Flooding accident category ‘phase 1’ overview (level L2B)…….…………...49 
Table 15: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview……..…...51 
Table 16: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview…..…...52 
Table 17: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview…………......64-65 
Table 18: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview……..………..66 
Table 19: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) overview………………….....74-75 
Table 20: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) equipment overview………...77-78 
Table 21: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 evaluation………….79-80 
Table 22: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 summary………………81 
Table 23: Timelines: all accident categories across all phases………………………......82 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Total losses by vessel type 2002-2013…………………………………………2 
Figure 2: Total losses by vessel type from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013…………………………3 
Figure 3: Causes of total losses from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013…………………………..…..3 
Figure 4: Heinrich’s Domino Model of Accident Causation………………………..…..12 
Figure 5: Swiss Cheese Model…………………………………………………………..13 
Figure 6: Risk Management Framework………………………………………………...15 
Figure 7: Interaction / coupling chart…………………………………………………....15 
Figure 8: SEMOMAP in 2004…………………………………………………………..22 
Figure 9: SEMOMAP in 2014…………………………………………………………..23 
Figure 10: Relationship between Table 1 and 2 of taxonomy applicable to ‘phase 0’.....28 
Figure 11: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.2 applicable to ‘phase 1’.29 
Figure 12: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.3 applicable to ‘phase 1’.30 
Figure 13: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.2 applicable to ‘phase 2’.31 
Figure 14: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.3 applicable to ‘phase 2’.32 
viii 
 
Figure 15: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.2 applicable to ‘phase 3’.33 
Figure 16: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.3 applicable to ‘phase 3’.33  
Figure 17: SMoC – Simple Model of Cognition………………………………………..34 
Figure 18: Wickens’ Model of Human Information Processing………………………..34 
Figure 19: FTA Monarch of the Seas…………………………………………………...44 
Figure 20: Flooding ‘phase 0’ operator overview...…………………………………….48 
Figure 21: Flooding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4)………………………………………...49 
Figure 22: Grounding ‘phase 0’ operator overview………………………………….....53 
Figure 23: Grounding ‘phase 0’ equipment overview…………………………………..53 
Figure 24: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2)………………………………………54 
Figure 25: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4)………………………………………55 
Figure 26: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5)………………………………………56 
Figure 27: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2)………………………………………57 
Figure 28: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4)………………………………………58 
Figure 29: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5)………………………………………59 
Figure 30: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L1-2)……………………………………....60 
Figure 31: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L3-4)………………………………………61 
Figure 32: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview…………………………………..62 
Figure 33: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview………………………………..63 
Figure 34: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2)………..………………………………...67 
Figure 35: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4) .………………………………………….....68 
Figure 36: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5) .………………………………………….....69 
Figure 37: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2) .………………………………………….....70 
Figure 38: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4) .………………………………………….....71 
Figure 39: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5) .………………………………………….....72 
Figure 40: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ HFACS category overview……………....76                   
  
ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BRM  Bridge Resource Management 
BTM  Bridge Team Management 
BSU  Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung 
CREAM Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
CSM  Continuous Survey of Machinery 
DNV  Det Norske Veritas 
DoD  Department of Defence, the United States of America  
ETTO  Efficiency Thoroughness Trade Off 
FSA  Formal Safety Assessment 
GEMS  Generic Error-Modelling System  
HEART Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique  
HFACS  Human Factors Analysis and Classification Systems  
IMO  International Maritime Organisation 
ISM   International Safety Management  
MaRiSa Maritime Risk and System Safety 
MSC  Maritime Safety Committee 
SEMOMAP SEquential MOdel of the Maritime Accident Process 
SMS  Safety Management System 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1974, as amended  
STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping Convention, 
1978, as amended 
TRACEr       Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive 
Errors  
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
WMU  World Maritime University 
WYLFIWYF What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find 
1 
  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation analyses passenger ship accident investigation reports with the 
SEMOMAP model and HFACS and TRACEr inspired taxonomies to explore accident 
processes that enable a system to achieve a safe system state and those that lead to a 
mitigated, severe or total loss. The opening chapter provides the background and 
motivation for the dissertation along with its aim and purpose. The chapter introduces 
the research problem under investigation and provides an outline structure of the 
dissertation. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
State-of-the-art passenger ships appear like floating residential towers and represent a 
marvel of scientific advances in technology (for ship fire safety design see, Cooke, 
2007). Despite that, even in the 21st-century, we are not immune to serious maritime 
accidents that have devastating consequences for life, property and the environment. 
The tragic sinking of the Costa Concordia in the beginning of 2012, a 100 years after 
the Titanic disaster (see Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012) highlights that even in the 
modern era of advanced technology, (allegedly) safer systems and international 
regulations, severe maritime accidents continue to occur. Even before the wreck of the 
Costa Concordia entered the final phase of its salvage operations in July 2014, another 
accident of a passenger ferry in April 2014 - Sewol captured international headlines 
with over 300 fatalities. Even though Sewol was a domestic ferry and not an 
international passenger ship, the accident and the loss of lives is disconcerting. 
 
Passenger ship accidents, that resulted in a total loss (99 ships) account for nearly 6% 
of all accidents from 2002 to 2013 (AGCS, 2014, p. 8) and this figure increases to 
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6.38% for 2013 (AGCS, 2014, p. 9). Figure 1 below, depicts the total losses by ship 
type for the years covering 2002-2013 and Figure 2 depicts the total losses by ship 
type for 2013. The biggest cause of the total loss was identified as foundering, 
accounting for 44.5% for the period ranging from 2002-2012 (AGCS, 2014, p. 10). 
The percentage for foundering increased to 73.4% for all total losses in 2013 (AGCS, 
2014, p. 11) (see figure 3).  
 
Figure 1: Total losses by vessel type 2002-2013 
Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 8) 
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Figure 2: Total losses by vessel type from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013 
Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 9) 
 
 
Figure 3: Causes of total losses from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013 
Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 11) 
  
Passenger ship accidents and accompanying devastating consequences, particularly for 
human life, capture the public imagination and provide impetus to the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) to 
regulate maritime safety and related issues with the aim of preventing accidents from 
recurring in the future. The 1914 version of the Safety of Life At Sea Convention 
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(SOLAS) (IMO, 1974, as amended) was the first version of the convention and a direct 
response to the Titanic disaster in 1912 which had resulted in over 1500 fatalities. The 
prominent accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 with a loss of 193 lives 
resulted in the introduction of the ISM code (IMO, 2002). While these come across as 
essentially reactive IMO actions to serious accidents (Tarelko, 2012), the organisation 
has done significant work in Passenger Ship Safety from 2000 onwards since the 
launch of the initiative. The following sub-section (1.1.1) discusses the work of the 
IMO in relation to passenger ship safety. 
 
1.1.1 IMO and PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 
The initiative on passenger ship safety was launched in Dec 2000 in MSC 72, at the 
turn of the century to evaluate the adequacy of rules and regulations with respect to 
large passenger ships as they had been framed before the construction of such ships. 
The size of the vessels, along with increase in passenger carrying capacity necessitated 
this initiative especially with respect to crew training and emergency situations. 
Aspects of the ship, people on board and the environment were to be taken into 
consideration by the respective subcommittees. It was agreed that future ship design 
should cater to improved survivability as “a ship is its best lifeboat” (IMO, 2000a). 
Initially the initiative aimed to address safety of large passenger ships in particular. 
However, subsequently it was considered beneficial for the safety of all passenger 
ships and accordingly re-titled. 
 
Five pillars have guided the work of the committee in this initiative which are 
prevention, improved survivability, regulatory flexibility, operations in areas remote 
from SAR facilities and health safety and medical care. A host of amendments were 
adopted in MSC 82 in 2006 that included amendments on alternate design, safe areas, 
safety centres, fire prevention, detection and alarm systems and evacuation and 
abandonment post breach of threshold (IMO, 2006, also see IMO, 2010b).  
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Previously regulations stated that passenger safety drills should take place within 24 
hours of departure. However, more recently MSC 91 in 2012 agreed to make passenger 
safety drills prior to, or immediately upon departure, mandatory (IMO, 2012). The 
same has been adopted into SOLAS regulation III/19 (IMO, 2013b, IMO, 1974, as 
amended) and are due to enter into force on 1 January 2015. In addition, MSC 92 
revised the recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance 
the safety of passenger ships. Among others, the recommendations include suggestions 
on lifejackets (placement and availability), emergency instructions to passengers, 
musters, securing heavy objects etc. (IMO, 2013c, also see IMO, 1997c).  
 
Despite safety initiatives, passenger ship accidents have continued to take place over 
the years. In the aftermath of an accident, the investigation process commences, and 
attempts to examine the accident in-depth and study its varied aspects, including the 
causes.  Learning from accidents is invaluable and the role of the IMO in casualty 
investigation follows in sub-section 1.1.2. 
 
1.1.2 IMO and CASUALTY INVESTIGATION 
The Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents was adopted in 
1997 noting that timely and accurate reports identifying the circumstances and causes 
of casualties and incidents contribute to enhancing the safety of passengers, crew and 
the environment. The code recognises the need for a standard approach to incident 
investigation (Resolution A.849(20), IMO, 1997a). However, no methodology is 
provided in the code, but the appendix of resolution A.849 (20) enumerates the 
guidelines to assist investigators in the implementation of the code.  
 
Noteworthy is that in 1997, IMO adopted the Human Element vision (Resolution 
A.850(20) IMO, 1997b). This is reflected in the Amendments to the Code for the 
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents in 1999 (Resolution A.884(21) IMO, 
2000b). The amendments provide Guidelines for the Investigation of Human Factors 
in marine accidents. Herein, the IMO has made reference to accident causation models 
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– the Hybrid model (Liveware, Hardware, Software, Environment: SHEL and Swiss 
Cheese) and Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990). The SHEL 
model is borrowed from the aviation industry (Hawkins, 1987). Accident investigation 
models are discussed in depth in the literature review chapter (number 2). More 
recently, resolution A.1075(28) (IMO, 2014a) revokes both resolutions A.849(20) and 
A.884(21) mentioned above. 
 
The Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety 
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident was adopted in MSC 84, 2008 
vide Resolution MSC.255(84). The code was made mandatory with inclusion into the 
SOLAS convention (chapter XI-1/6) vide Resolution MSC.257(84) and came into 
effect in 2010. The main objectives of the code are to provide a common approach for 
the conduct of investigations to promote learning and prevent such incidents from 
recurring in the future (MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.2, IMO, 2008). Revised Harmonised 
Reporting Procedures for reports required under the SOLAS I/21 and XI-1/6 and 
MARPOL (Marine Pollution, (IMO, 1973/1978) articles 8 and 12 are given in MSC-
MEPC.3/Circ.4 (IMO, 2013a). 
 
The IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation in its 19th session in Dec 2010 
included the study on human and organisational factors by WMU, under the category 
of casualty statistics and investigations (IMO, 2010a). The WMU study was based on 
a PhD study by Ghirxi (2010), (also see Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2010). The 
committee noted WMU’s findings that the errors committed by operators at the sharp 
end were over represented and organisational and supervisory factors were scarcely 
identified in the investigation reports. This led to the conlusions that the investigators 
either are, not completely aware of the casualty investigation guidelines or have 
difficulty in applying them. Some accident investigation reports were found to have 
been prematurely terminated which did not allow for supervisory and organisational 
factors to be identified. Guidance on the importance of organisational factors and their 
identification were absent which could have contributed to the findngs of the study 
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which were skewed towards operators at the sharp end. Lack of harmonisation in the 
reports across flag states was also identified as reports were of varying levels of detail. 
This dissertation focuses on exploring the accident processes and not solely on the 
inclusion of human factors, however, this study will reveal findings on identification 
of human factors in passenger ship accidents as this study utilises the HFACS 
taxonomy, similar to Ghirxi (2010) and Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010). A study by 
Korolija and Lundberg (2010) has revealed the differing and emergent meanings of 
human factors for professional investigators in transport sector in Sweden, including 
maritime. This points to the lack of harmonisation in the understanding of the concept 
of human factors. 
 
The background of the dissertation has been presented in section 1.1 and the aim, 
purpose and motivation for the dissertation is presented in the folowing section (1.2). 
 
1.2 AIM, PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION FOR THE DISSERTATION 
The motivation for this dissertation stems from the tragic passenger ship accidents that 
continue to take place even in the 21st-century. In line with the aim of Schröder (2004), 
this dissertation aims to evaluate accidents to understand and identify why certain 
unfolding processes during an accident situation lead to a safe system state while 
others lead to a mitigated loss and some tragically result in a total loss involving 
fatalities. The purpose of the dissertation is twofold, on the one hand, the project 
studies accident investigation reports to analyse the processes in-depth while on the 
other, the project is an evaluation of the SEMOMAP model itself. The research 
questions identified for the dissertation are provided in the following subsection. 
 
1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In continuation of Schröder (2004), the research aims to study the complex unfolding 
of the accident process and will increase the knowledge of accident processes for 
specific maritime accident categories (fire, flooding and grounding) and the barriers, 
if any, that shaped the path and influenced the accident outcome from a near miss to a 
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mitigated loss to a total loss. The research questions addressed in the dissertation are 
provided below. 
o Is the maritime industry specific SEMOMAP suitable to explore maritime 
accidents?  
o What is it about the unique unfolding of the accident process on board and 
the shipboard behaviours and barriers, if any, that can lead to different 
accident outcomes for different accidents.  
o What are the common processes in emergency situations on-board in case 
of fire, grounding and foundering? 
o How much time is available to recover from an emergency situation during 
the different phases of the accident? 
o How realistic is the time limit of 30 minutes required for abandoning ship, 
post breach of threshold.  
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter of the study introduced 
the background, aims, objectives and the motivation for the dissertation. The chapter 
presented the research problem against the backdrop of IMO’s work on passenger ship 
safety as well as casualty investigation. The chapter also presented the research 
questions of the dissertation and provided an overview of the structure of the study. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review chapter which reviews prevalent accident causation 
models, investigation methods and related taxonomies for coding data. This chapter 
also makes a comment about the state-of-the-art of maritime accident investigation 
methods in particular. This chapter provides a background to the SEMOMAP model 
and justifies its need in the accident investigation domain. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology adopted in the dissertation. It presents the 
SEMOMAP model in great detail. The chapter also presents the two complementary 
taxonomies that support the SEMOMAP model and lend a comprehensive focus to the 
model, while at the same time integrating the human factors in accident investigation.  
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Chapter 4 is an empirical findings chapter. The chapter clarifies the model and the 
taxonomy with the help of a case study example that takes the reader step-by-step 
through the application of the SEMOMAP model. The chapter presents the findings 
from the analysis of fifteen passenger ship accident investigation reports. Reports are 
examined and analysed with the application of the model; data is coded step-by-step 
using the taxonomies and the analysis is iterated as required by the accident processes 
depicted in the report. The findings for the different categories of maritime accidents 
are collated and presented in chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 5 reflects on the dissertation results and SEMOMAP model.  
 
Chapter 6, the final chapter concludes the dissertation, presents the impact of the 
findings for IMO, academia, industry and seafarers. The chapter provides the 
conclusions of the dissertation and makes appropriate recommendations as required. 
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2. ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODELS – A LITERATURE REVIEW1 
 
This chapter presents a state-of-the-art of accident causation models (sequential, 
epidemiological, socio-technical and systemic) and analysis methods. This chapter 
also refers to the pertinent taxonomies that support accident investigation. This chapter 
identifies the gaps in the literature and justifies the need for SEMOMAP in maritime 
accident investigation domain. 
 
Shipping is regarded as a high risk industry similar to aviation, nuclear, chemical and 
the like. The high-risk nature of the industry and the consequential huge losses make 
it imperative that accident investigation is robust to serve its purpose. The need for 
accident investigation as a learning opportunity is widely recognised and lessons can 
be drawn to prevent recurrences in the future. Accident causation models, investigation 
methods and taxonomies are the tools at the disposal of investigators to commence 
their analysis in the aftermath of an accident. Accident investigation is also a moral 
responsibility of the administrations towards citizens. 
 
15 years prior to the Costa Concordia accident Rasmussen (1997, p.183), in the context 
of risk management has asked whether, ‘we actually have adequate models of accident 
causation in the present dynamic society?’ He argues for a, ‘model of behaviour 
shaping mechanisms in terms of work system constraints, boundaries of acceptable 
performance and subjective criteria guiding adaptation to change’ (1997, p.183). The 
adequacy and suitability of accident investigation models continues to be open for 
academic deliberation. 
                                                          
1 The student has presented a version of the state of the art of accident investigation models in MSEA 
252 course assignment on Risk Management. 
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Accident causation models for investigating the causes of industrial accidents began 
with Heinrich (1931). Accident investigation models, supportive taxonomies, safety, 
risk and reliability analyses have evolved over the major part of the century. Today 
several models and analysis methods are currently in use (Hollnagel, 1998, Kirwan, 
1994, Reason, 1990, Reason, 1997a, Kristiansen, 1995, Hollnagel, 2004, Reason, 
2008, Qureshi, 2007). The IMO, in its work promotes the investigation of casualties 
and incidents (IMO, 1997a, IMO, 2000b, IMO, 2013a, IMO, 2014a) to promote 
learning and stop accidents from recurring. Learning from accidents, contributes to the 
‘collective memory’ that has been identified as ‘missing’ by Schröder-Hinrichs (2013). 
Organizations in the Maritime domain need to learn from risk (Manuel, 2012) in order 
to mitigate it. The following section (2.1) reviews the prominent sequential, 
epidemiological and systemic models of accident causation that shape subsequent 
investigations. 
 
2.1 SEQUENTIAL, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND SYSTEMIC MODELS 
This section discusses the three types of accident causation models characterized by 
Hollnagel (2004) as sequential, epidemiological and systemic. The section provides an 
overview of the models and their suitability to the different kinds of accidents under 
investigation.  
 
Models of accident causation, inform the choice of the related methods suitable for 
accident investigation and they should complement each other (Katsakiori et al., 2009, 
Underwood and Waterson, 2013). In a Maritime context, the investigating body 
requires a suitable model for the focus of its investigation. A taxonomy suitable to the 
model is chosen/adapted/developed to inform the data gathering methods for analysis 
as done by Schröder-Hinrichs, Baldauf & Ghirxi (2011) and Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 
(2013). Accident investigation methods are different from accident causation models. 
The methods are the tools that help in data gathering in line with the philosophy of the 
models. A state of the art of accident investigation methods has been carried out by 
several authors (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008, Sklet, 2004, Katsakiori et al., 2009). 
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Accident causation models have been divided into three main groups, 'general models 
of the accident process', 'models of human error and unsafe behaviour' and 'models of 
human injury mechanics’ (Lehto and Salvendy, 1991). However, this dissertation, 
utilizes the characterization by Hollnagel (2004) that addresses accident causation as 
a whole and does not differentiate between the models on the basis of human injury, 
human error, behaviour and process. 
 
2.1.1 SEQUENTIAL MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
Sequential accident causation models are the simplest models that describe the ‘one 
after the other’ linear order of the sequence of events. The sequential model is suitable 
when there are specific causes of the accident and well-defined links between the 
events. The sequential models recognize that the accident can be prevented by 
removing any one of the factors in the sequence (Hollnagel, 2004). Two prominent 
examples of the sequential models are the Domino theory of Heinrich (1931, Heinrich, 
1980) and fault trees. 
 
Figure 4: Heinrich’s Domino Model of Accident Causation 
Source: Qureshi (2008, p.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
2.1.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
The term ‘epidemiological’ comes from the bio-medical domain and describes 
accident causation like the, ‘spreading of a disease’ (Hollnagel, 2004, p.54). 
Epidemiological models acknowledge that accidents have several contributory factors 
and take into account the latent conditions (pathogens), barriers, environmental 
conditions together with contributory causes of the accident. A prominent example of 
the epidemiological model is Reason’s Swiss cheese model (1997b). It is complex 
linear in outlook and when the holes align, barriers are breached and accidents occur.  
 
Figure 5: Swiss Cheese Model 
Source: Reason (1997) 
 
The Swiss cheese model takes into account the attributing ‘blunt end factors far 
removed in space and time’ and the ‘sharp end factors at work here and now’ 
(Hollnagel, 2004, p.63). The decision-makers, line management, preconditions for 
unsafe acts, defences and/or barriers, unsafe acts taken together provide the anatomy 
of the accident. Accidents are considered to be preventable by strengthening 
defences/barriers. 
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2.1.3 SYSTEMIC MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
Systemic models address the system as a whole. Accident investigation models have 
evolved from identifying single causes to multiple causes of accidents to unforeseen 
complex emergent outcomes (Perrow, 1984). Systems need to be understood in their 
entirety to maintain the health of the system and prevent accidents. An understanding 
of the complex interactions and combinations is required with respect to the mutually 
interacting variables. Accident investigation models have evolved from a ‘person 
approach’ holding an individual responsible to a ‘system approach’ where the focus 
is not on ‘who blundered, but how and by the defences failed’ (Reason, 2000). The 
nature and perception of risk has evolved over time. Risk needs to be understood to be 
mitigated and understanding risk is difficult in increasingly complex socio-technical 
systems (Hollnagel, 2008).  
 
In ‘Normal Accidents’, Perrow (1984) discusses interactions and coupling in a system. 
A nuclear power plant is the most complex intractable system with a very tight degree 
of coupling. Hollnagel (2008) discusses the suitability of accident causation models 
based on the degree of coupling and tractability/manageability. He argues that System 
– Theoretical Model of Accidents (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004) and Functional 
Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004) are suitable for tightly coupled 
intractable systems, while Cognitive Reliability and Error Assessment Method 
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998) is more suitable for retractable, tightly coupled systems. 
Another example of a system model is ACCIMAP (Rasmussen, 1997). Figure 6 on 
page 15 depicts the Risk Management Framework of Rasmussen (1997) and Figure 7, 
also on page 15 depicts the Interaction/coupling chart of Perrow (1984). 
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Figure 6: Risk 
Management 
Framework 
 
Source: Rasmussen 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: 
Interaction / 
coupling chart 
 
Source: Perrow 
(1984, p.327) 
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2.2 EVALUATION OF SEQUENTIAL, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND 
SYSTEMIC MODELS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
The simple linear cause-and-effect models fail to depict the complexity of accident 
causation and therefore are unsuitable for the purpose of analysing complex accidents. 
The Swiss cheese model has been considered suitable to analyze accidents in domains 
which are tightly coupled and tractable/manageable as in the case of Maritime 
transport (Hollnagel, 2008), which features in the first quadrant of Perrow (1984, 
p.327) and is considered less complex than a nuclear power plant. The Swiss cheese 
model can provide a comprehensive picture of the accident under several categories of 
unsafe acts, conditions, supervision and organizational. Therefore, the epidemiological 
model is suitable in analysing complex accidents (Le-Coze, 2013). The aim is not to 
state which model is better, but to identify the model which is fit for purpose/suitable 
with respect to the accident investigation. The sequential model is simplistic, it cannot 
address complexity, multiple actors or multiple factors. The sequential model is 
suitable for loosely coupled, tractable simple systems. The sequential model provides 
an identification of the active causes of the accident and does not address the 
underlying latent contributory factors. Therefore the sequential model does not do 
justice to the accident investigation of complex accidents. Neither does the sequential 
model identify all the information for the investigator(s) and nor does it promote 
learning from the accident to prepare the organization if a similar accident were to 
recur in the future 
 
“if Maritime safety is to be sustainably improved, a systemic focus must 
be adopted in future accident investigations” (Schroder-Hinrichs and 
Hollnagel, 2012, p.1) 
 
Accident models have evolved into systemic that follow a holistic system approach. 
This approach considers the fallibility human beings and the focus has shifted from 
identifying individual human errors to barriers, safe guards and defences to 
understand why they failed (Reason, 2000). A systemic model addresses the 
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complexity in critical and complex socio – technical systems made up of regularly 
interacting interrelated interdependent components.  
 
2.4 MARITIME SPECIFIC MODELS 
Schröder (2004), provides a state of the art regarding the ‘models and approaches used 
for maritime casualty analysis’. He finds that some models are generic, while the 
others – CASMET, TRIPOD (Reason, 1997a), Loss Causation Model (DNV) focus on 
accidents from the organisational perspective. Schröder (2004) expands on the 
SEMOMAP model developed by him  and the related taxonomy, particularly for the 
maritime industry (also see Schroder and Hahne, 2003). The SEMOMAP explores the 
accident process and focuses on the question, ‘why some accidents develop into total 
losses and while others can be successfully mitigated at a certain level of the accident 
processes’. Schröder (2004) presents promising preliminary results for SEMOMAP. 
The identified gap in the academic literature is that the maritime industry has hitherto 
utilised generic models for analysing accidents in the maritime domain and the 
maritime industry specific models in existence presently, have an overtly 
organisational focus. In the dissertation, the student aims to work towards the 
validation of the SEMOMAP model as it offers a sharp maritime industry specific 
focus while addressing Rasmussen’s (1997) question regarding the existence of 
adequate models in dynamic society. Maritime accident and investigation is applied in 
real-world research. The model is unique as it exclusively focuses on the Maritime 
accident investigation domain and is not generic in its outlook. After reviewing the 
available models, it can be argued that the maritime industry requires improved 
accident investigation models that can better aid accident investigators in analysing 
complex accidents.  Despite being sequential, SEMOMAP with it two complementary 
taxonomies provides a suitable answer in this respect as it is capable of capturing 
complexity with a comprehensive focus. SEMOMAP focuses on the accident process 
and acknowledges heroic contributions, if any, that helped a system to recover, which 
is overlooked by most models as they are reactive in focus. SEMOMAP is a sequential 
model, however, it is complex linear in outlook due to its comprehensiveness.  
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2.6 TAXONOMY FOR CODING DATA 
An accident investigation requires an accident causation model in line with the focus 
of inquiry, which encompasses the philosophy of the accident. Furthermore, a 
taxonomy related to the model is required for data analysis (Schröder, 2003). Reason 
(1997b) had not provided a taxonomy for the accompanying Swiss cheese model. The 
HFACS taxonomy specifically developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) in 
aviation is in line with the philosophy of the Swiss cheese model. Apart from aviation, 
the HFACS has been adapted for use in diverse areas like railroad, mining etc. HFACS 
has been adapted for exploring machinery space fires in Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 
(2010) and for evaluating the inclusion of maritime human factors in IMO policy 
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). A detailed overview of the adapted taxonomy for this 
dissertation is given in chapter 3 on Methodology. This dissertation also utilizes a 
second taxonomy that is inspired by TRACEr (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) as the 
dissertation looks at the accident processes which involve human-machine interaction 
and therefor the HFACS alone is not considered sufficient for this study. The TRACEr 
inspired taxonomy helps to evaluate the different accident phases while taking into 
account the human-machine interaction. The adapted HFACS taxonomy and the 
TRACEr inspired taxonomies are discussed in detail in chapter 3 of the dissertation 
and are provided in the accompanying appendices.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
As a responsible Maritime Administration, learning from accidents is a crucial aspect 
to prevent future recurrences. Accidents such as the Costa Concordia go beyond the 
organisation and impact the national, supranational and the international domain 
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find’ and 
‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’ are two principles discussed by Hollnagel (2008 
cited in Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012). These two principles show 
the limited outcome of traditional accident investigations. Identifying and holding 
individuals responsible in complex accidents such as the Costa Concordia, defeats 
the very purpose of accident investigations and does not benefit society in the long 
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run. The limited viewpoint does not help to learn from the accident and the industry 
might witness another similar accident in the future, as in the case of the Costa 
Concordia which occurred a century after the Titanic, and the disastrous Sewol ferry 
accident which took place in 2014 before the final salvage operation for the Costa 
Concordia could be completed.  
 
The efficiency – thoroughness trade – off (ETTO) (Hollnagel, 2009) principle is 
faced by the workers in their day-to-day lives and it is the duty of the investigating 
body to ensure the practices and the conditions leading to the safety culture on-board 
are identified together with their complexity. Reason (2000) argues that the culture 
of High Reliability Organizations (HRO) helps to make the system robust and 
resilient. High reliability organizations have an enhanced safety culture which is 
supported by an effective reporting culture and a just culture (Reason, 1998). The 
recurrence of accidents highlights that organizations don’t learn from accidents. An 
enhanced safety culture is the need of the Maritime domain which will enhance 
resilience and contribute to heroic recoveries at the edge of error (Reason, 2008). 
 
Research on accident causes (for MaRCAT, see Cafferty and Baker, 2006, Caridis, 
1999) does not capture the in situ unfolding of the accident process with a focus on 
human machine interface (HMI) while at the same time identifying the HFACS factors 
that impact on-board human operators and technical subjects as SEMOMAP. 
 
This literature review chapter has discussed the state of the art of accident causation 
models and evaluated their suitability for investigating the different domains. The 
chapter also discussed maritime specific models and identified that SEMOMAP is the 
only model with a maritime focus that enables the study of the unfolding accident 
process. The chapter also discussed the need for an appropriate taxonomy to support 
data analysis in line with the vision of the model. This chapter has justified the need 
for SEMOMAP in maritime investigations. Chapter 3 on research methods utilised for 
the dissertation, follows after the review of literature. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This chapter pertains to the research methodology adopted in the study and particularly 
to the application of the SEMOMAP accident investigation model with the help of a 
case study example. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The research methodology adopted in the study involves the analyses of fifteen 
accident investigation reports along the philosophy of the SEMOMAP model. Each 
individual report is studied in detail and coded according to the two taxonomies of 
HFACs and a taxonomy inspired by TRACEr. The HFACs taxonomy was initially 
developed in aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). HFACS primarily deals with 
underlying causal human factors of an accident, while TRACEr, also from aviation 
(Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) takes into account the human machine interface and is 
useful for both the retrospective and the predictive analysis of issues in accidents. 
HFACs has been adapted for the maritime domain previously in the investigation of 
machinery space fires and explosions by Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010). This 
dissertation takes the application of SEMOMAP further to passenger ship accidents. 
 
The sample selection of the accident investigation reports for the dissertation requires 
further enumeration. The fifteen reports selected for the study are of passenger ship 
accidents that have taken place from 1998 onwards. The benchmark year of 1998 has 
been selected as it was the year of the introduction of the ISM code and in this respect 
it would be safe to assume that the ships would have a functional SMS on board to 
comply with the regulations. In addition, the training requirements for personnel in 
crowd management and control for assisting passengers during emergency situations, 
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including for evacuation (IMO, 1997c) as given in the STCW code, Chapter V, would 
also be reflected in the sample after the introduction date of January 1999. Table 12 
on page 46 lists the sample of fifteen accident investigation reports of passenger ship 
accidents analysed in this dissertation.  
 
3.2 SEMOMAP 
SEMOMAP was developed during the PhD research study of Schröder (2004). 
SEMOMAP poses the question and seeks to answer why some processes in an accident 
lead to a recovery of the safe system state while others lead to a mitigated or a total 
loss? SEMOMAP is inspired by human recovery and error management. The 
philosophy behind SEMOMAP is that the outcome of an incident hinges on a number 
of critical processes. Catastrophic events can be averted if these processes are correctly 
accomplished at any point, before or after the commencement of the accident timeline. 
Depending upon when the incident is averted, the vessel can suffer various degrees of 
loss, or even, no loss at all.  
 
SEMOMAP specifically focusses on the accident process, emergency management 
and within it, the human operator. SEMOMAP has evolved significantly from 2004 
when it was conceptualised. The SEMOMAP model from 2004 is depicted in figure 8 
and the current 2014 model is depicted in figure 9. SEMOMAP has evolved 
significantly as a model, is sharper in focus and comprehensively embraces the 
accident process. The accompanying taxonomy of SEMOMAP has also evolved 
significantly and will be discussed subsequently in the chapter.  
 
Previously SEMOMAP sub-divided the accident processes into 6 stages/results; 
dangerous situation, beginning accident, near miss, accident, mitigated loss and total 
loss (see figure 8). The current model (figure 9) clearly differentiates between the 4 
phases of the accident (contributory factors, beginning of the accident, accident and 
evacuation) and the 5 results/outcomes of the processes (recovery, mitigated/severe/ 
total loss with and without casualties).  
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Figure 8: SEMOMAP in 2004 
Source: Schröder (2003 cited in 2004) 
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Figure 9: SEMOMAP in 2014; Source: Schröder-Hinrichs (2014) 
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The 4 phases of the current SEMOMAP Model (figure 9) are provided along the top. 
They are: phase 0 - contributory factors that led to a dangerous situation on board, 
phase 1 - beginning of the accident, phase 2 - accident itself and phase 3 - evacuation. 
The results/outcomes are given along the bottom. The five results/outcomes of the 
accident process in SEMOMAP are the return to safe operation after taking 
appropriate action to mitigate the threat; depending upon the time of threat detection, 
analysis and threat mitigation actions, the outcomes can range from a mitigated loss to 
a severe loss; the extreme outcome of an accident is total loss of the vessel, with and 
without causalities.  
 
3.2.1 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 0’ – CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS 
The 2014 SEMOMAP model regards the first phase of the accident as phase 0, in 
which the contributory factors that led to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board 
are identified. At this juncture, the adapted HFACS taxonomy is used to help identify 
the latent conditions and contributory factors of the accident. This phase occurs prior 
to the incident. The evaluation of the issues suggests that if the issues have been 
resolved then the incident does not take place and the vessel is considered safe. 
However, if the evaluation reveals that the issues have not been resolved then the 
accident enters the second phase. The adapted HFACS taxonomy used in the study is 
discussed in detail in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.2 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 1’ – BEGINNING ACCIDENT 
The second phase of the SEMOMAP is referred to as phase 1 which looks at the 
beginning of the accident. At this stage, the accident is considered to be preventable 
by performing suitable and adequate preventive actions that can help to recover from 
the incident. Phase 1 commences as there is an imminent risk of incident due to the 
unresolved issues from the preceding phase 0. To return to a safe system state, 
indicated threat of imminent risk needs to be detected, analysed and appropriate 
preventive actions need to be undertaken. If the actions are successful then the system 
returns to safe operations and if unsuccessful, then the model evaluates if any further 
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measures were tried. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the model evaluates 
if there is a risk of other incidents. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the 
model enters the third phase of the accident. Incident categories can go together as in 
the case of collision and foundering in the Costa Concordia accident. SEMOMAP 
allows for studying accident processes as it enables the iteration to explore further 
threats to the ship system. SEMOMAP is a sequential model, but its iterative 
investigative capacity makes it complex linear in outlook. Phase 1, 2 and 3 of the 
accident utilise the taxonomy based on Hollnagel (1998), Kirwan (1994) and TRACEr.  
 
3.2.3 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 2’ – ACCIDENT 
The third phase of the SEMOMAP is the accident phase, in which the incident has 
occurred. It is referred to as phase 2. At this stage, the accident could still be contained 
to limit losses. Once the incident has occurred at the beginning of phase 2, the system 
health indication needs to be detected, analysed and appropriate emergency response 
measures need to be taken. If the emergency response measures are successful, the 
model helps assess, if the vessel can sail unassisted to port - If ‘Yes’, it is a mitigated 
loss and if, ‘No’, it is a severe loss. If emergency response measures are unsuccessful, 
then the model evaluates if any further measures were tried. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates 
back and if, ‘No’, the model evaluates if there is a risk of other incidents. If ‘Yes’, the 
loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the model enters the final phase of the accident. 
SEMOMAP allows comprehensive iteration to evaluate the existence of other related 
threats in phase 1 and 2 of the accident process.   
 
3.2.4 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 3’ – EVACUATION 
The final phase of the accident is phase 3 in which evacuation and related emergency 
response is the best option under the circumstances. At this stage casualties to human 
life can be limited to zero with appropriate evacuation processes and procedures. In 
this phase the evacuation measures are put in place and emergency response actions 
continue to fight for time. System health indication in the final accident phase needs 
to be detected and analysed. If other measures are tried, the loop iterates back and if 
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no further measures are tried and evacuation measures are successful, there is a degree 
of loss without casualties. If evacuation measures are not successful, there is a degree 
of loss with casualties. The model is comprehensive and allows for analysing complex 
accidents. The following sub-section discusses the SEMOMAP taxonomy in detail. 
 
3.3 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY 
The SEMOMAP model utilises a very comprehensive taxonomy for data coding and 
analysis. The full taxonomy along with the accompanying codes is provided in the 
codebook in the appendix.  
 
3.3.1 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 0’ 
Table 0.1 of the taxonomy is applicable to phase 0 of the accident (see appendix). It is 
based on HFACS and suitable for identifying the factors that led to the dangerous 
situation on-board. The taxonomy allows for a four level coding for each of the four 
identified contributory aspects (unsafe acts, pre-conditions for unsafe acts, supervision 
and organisational influence). The operators (human subjects) and equipment 
(technical subjects) affected need to be identified and coded first. See table 2 for the 5 
contributory aspects and first three levels of coding. The complete taxonomy table with 
the fourth level of detail is given in the appendix. 
 
Table 1: Subjects affected by influencing factors (applicable to phase 0) 
Source: Table 0.1 SEMOMAP Taxonomy Codebook (see appendix) 
H
u
m
a
n
 
S
u
b
je
ct
s 
Captain & Officers Captain, 1st/Chief; 2nd; 3rd; Other Officer,  
Navigators Helmsman, Pilot 
Other crew AB, Bosun, OS 
Engineers 1st/Chief Engineer, 2nd/Other Engineer 
T
ec
h
n
ic
a
l 
S
u
b
je
ct
s 
Bridge & Deck Steering equipment, Navigation aids (AIS, 
ECDIS, GPS etc.), Communication equipment, 
Alarm panels & system 
Engine room Main / auxiliary engine, engine control panel, fuel 
/ ballast water pumps, generators, boilers 
Ship structure & design Hull, separators 
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Table 2: SEMOMAP Taxonomy ‘phase 0’; factors leading to the dangerous situation; 
adapted HFACS 
Source: Table 0.1 SEMOMAP Taxonomy Codebook (see appendix) 
 
A further, fourth level of detail of table 2 is provided in the taxonomy codebook in the 
appendix. Table 1 and 2 are part of the phase 0 taxonomy of SEMOMAP and enable 
the identification and coding of factors that led to the creation of a dangerous situation 
on-board in line with HFACS. A unique aspect in this instance is that SEMOMAP 
allows for the identification and coding of the factors against each of the human and 
technical subjects individually for an accident, thus leading to a more comprehensive 
Organizational Influences I 
Resource Management 
Lack of human resources 
Poor technological resources 
Poor equipment / facility 
resources 
Organizational climate 
Disorganized structure 
Inadequate policies 
Poor work culture 
Organizational process 
Poorly designed operations 
Inappropriate procedures 
Lack of oversight 
Statutory factors 
Poor international / national 
standards 
Inadequate flag state 
implementation 
Supervision II 
Inadequate supervision Poor shipborne and shore 
supervision 
Planned inappropriate 
Operations 
Poor shipborne operations 
Failed to correct known 
problems 
Shipborne related shortcomings 
Supervisory Violations Shipborne violations 
Preconditions III 
Environmental Factors 
Poor physical environment 
Poor technical environment 
Crew Condition 
Negative cognitive factors 
Poor physiological state 
Personnel Factors 
Poor crew interaction 
Poor personal readiness 
Unsafe Acts IV 
Errors 
Skill based errors 
Decision and judgment errors 
Perceptual Errors 
Violations 
Routine 
Exceptional 
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evaluation. Figure 10 below depicts the relation between the phase 0 taxonomy 
depicted in table 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 10: Relationship between Table 1 and 2 of taxonomy applicable to phase 0 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 1’ 
It is noteworthy that the taxonomy utilised in accident phase 1, 2 and 3 are inspired by 
Hollnagel (1998), Kirwan (1994) and TRACEr. Phase 1 pertains to the beginning of 
the accident. Taxonomy tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are applicable to this phase (see 
codebook in appendix) The SEMOMAP taxonomies allow for the identification of 
barriers, recovery processes, human-machine interaction and threat mitigation actions 
undertaken during the unfolding accident situation. Table 3 (taxonomy table 1.1) 
essentially pertains to the risk faced by the system 
 
Table 3: ‘Risk of’ incident; taxonomy table 1.1 Applicable to ‘phase 1’ 
Source: Table 1.1 SEMOMAP taxonomy codebook (appendix 2) 
Navigational Incidents 
Collision 
Grounding 
Contact 
Onboard Incidents 
Fire 
Explosion 
Structure Failure 
Engine Failure 
Loss of Control 
Equipment Damage 
Entire Vessel Incidents Capsize/Listing; Flooding/Foundering 
Personnel Incidents Occupational accident 
Human Subjects 
Technical Subjects 
Organizational Influences 
Supervision 
Preconditions 
Unsafe Acts 
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In the first instance, the threat faced by the system is ascertained. Thereafter taxonomy 
table 1.2 is applicable, which is the data table for phase 1 of the accident and is 
subdivided into three main categories – navigational incidents, on-board incidents and 
entire vessel incidents. Accordingly threat indication has to be detected, analysed and 
appropriate preventive action undertaken. Table 1.2 allows for five levels of coding 
(see appendix). Taxonomy table 1.2 is graphically depicted in figure 11 below. The 
taxonomy (1.2) includes the equipment (objects), persons and actions that were 
involved in the phase. 
 
Figure 11: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.2 applicable to ‘phase 1’ 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxonomy table 1.3 (see appendix), allows in-depth coding of the human machine 
interaction and the accident processes that occurred in the beginning accident phase. 
The table allows for five levels of coding and addresses the aspects of threat 
indication, threat detection, threat analysis and initial threat prevention action 
undertaken in the beginning accident phase. This phase covers how an accident could 
have been avoided altogether. The taxonomy of this phase evaluates the functioning 
Navigational 
Incidents 
On-Board 
Incidents 
Entire-Vessel 
Incidents 
Threat 
Indication 
Threat 
Detection Threat Analysis 
Threat Prevention 
Action 
On-board Ashore Off board 
Equipment Human Action 
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of specific threat indicator, detector, analyser and action with respect to human and/or 
equipment failure. The graphical representation of taxonomy 1.3 is given in figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.3 applicable to ‘phase 1' 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The coding of taxonomy table 1.3, goes deeper and comprises 5 levels. If in level 3, 
an aspect is applicable but not successful, then the failure is identified in level 4 and 
further elaborated in level 5. 
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3.3.3 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 2’ 
Once the accident enters the second phase, taxonomy tables for the second phase (2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3 see appendix) are applicable. In the beginning of phase 2, the accident in 
the system is identified and acknowledged utilising a similar taxonomy given in table 
3 on page 28. In this phase, the accident has taken place and system health needs to be 
ascertained. First the system health needs to be indicated, detected, analysed and 
appropriate emergency response needs to be taken. The 2.2 taxonomy includes the 
equipment (objects), persons and actions that were involved in the phase. 
 
Figure 13: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.2 applicable to ‘phase 2’ 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxonomy table 2.3 pertains to how an accident could have been contained in the face 
of danger. Taxonomy table 2.3 is depicted graphically in figure 14. The taxonomy 
delves deep to specify the details of human and equipment failure which occurred due 
to applicable but unsuccessful outcomes. This taxonomy table answers why certain 
aspects were unsuccessful in the context of the accident. 
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Figure 14: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.3 applicable to ‘phase 2’ 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.4 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 3’ 
Once the accident enters phase 3, evacuation is necessary to limit loss of life and 
emergency and evacuation procedures get underway. Taxonomy tables 3.2 and 3.3 
(see appendix) are applicable in phase 3 of the accident. Taxonomy table 3.2 is 
depicted diagrammatically in figure 15 and contains the objects, persons and actions 
involved in the final phase. Taxonomy table 3.3 is given in figure 16 and covers how 
an accident could have been contained to limit losses in the face of danger. In the 
evacuation phase, the crucial aspect is to protect human lives and limit fatalities. In the 
final phase of the accident emergency response and evacuation takes precedence over 
system health indication, detection and analysis. 
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Figure 15: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.2 applicable to ‘phase 3’ 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.3 applicable to ‘phase 3’  
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
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In the third and final phase of the accident in SEMOMAP, emergency and evacuation 
actions and procedures are well underway and the personnel fight for time.  
 
SEMOMAP reflects the Simple Model of Cognition given by Hollnagel (1998) (see 
figure 17) in which the data observed/identified impacts the interpretation, and the 
planning/choice of action/execution, though not necessarily in order. SEMOMAP also 
draws upon Wickens’ Model of Human Information processing (see figure 18). 
 
Figure 17: SMoC – Simple Model of Cognition 
Source: Hollnagel (1998) 
 
 
Figure 18: Wickens’ Model of Human Information Processing 
Source: Liebl et al., 2011 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology adopted for the dissertation. The 
rationale for the sample selection is also discussed. This chapter has presented the 
SEMOMAP model in great detail. The chapter has enumerated the model’s four 
comprehensive accident phases (0, 1, 2 and 3) and the results / outcomes of the 
maritime incident. The chapter has also discussed in detail the SEMOMAP taxonomy 
applicable to each of the phases and the philosophy behind the taxonomy.  
 
In addition to exploring the accident process in great detail, SEMOMAP helps to obtain 
quantitative data that allows for the creation of fault trees, event trees, risk 
contribution trees and related risk assessment diagrams. The data from the 
SEMOMAP analysis can also potentially be used to create improved decision support 
systems, which take into account the actions, inaction and time periods to provide 
adequate and appropriate support to shipboard personnel (see appendix, SEMOMAP 
codebook).  
 
After a discussion of the research methodology in chapter 3, the following chapter 
presents the findings of the study. 
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4 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS 
 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the analysis of the accident investigation reports. A 
total of fifteen publicly available investigation reports of passenger ship accidents were 
analysed utilising the SEMOMAP model and accompanying taxonomies. The list of 
accident investigation reports analysed in this dissertation is given in table 12. A more 
detailed list including the narratives of the accident is included in the appendix. The 
breakdown of the analysed accident investigation reports is given in table 4.  
 
Table 4: Breakdown of accident investigation reports analyzed 
Source: Student 
Accident Category Fire Grounding Flooding Total 
Reports analyzed 8 6 1 15 
 
The chapter opens with a solved case study example which depicts the step by step 
application of the taxonomy to code an accident investigation report in line with the 
philosophy of the SEMOMAP model. 
 
4.1 SEMOMAP SOLVED CASE STUDY EXAMPLE 
The accident investigation report chosen for the step-by-step application of the 
SEMOMAP taxonomy is Monarch of the Seas, a Norwegian flagged ship which 
grounded on the Proselyte reef in Great Bay, Philipsburg, St. Maarten, Netherlands in 
1998. The result of the incident was major damage to the vessel; there was no loss of 
life and minor pollution resulted from the incident. The brief narrative of the accident, 
from the investigation report is provided to familiarise the reader with the casualty. 
Thereafter, the step-by-step walk-through of the taxonomy application is given. 
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Summary 
At approximately 0030 hours on the night of 15 December 1998, the passenger vessel 
MONARCH OF THE SEAS arrived outside of Great Bay, St. Maarten in order to 
evacuate a sick passenger to a shore side medical facility. At 0125 the vessel’s crew 
completed the passenger evacuation evolution and the MONARCH OF THE SEAS 
departed St. Maarten, taking a South-South-easterly departure route with the intention 
of safely passing to the east of the Proselyte reef obstruction. At approximately 0130 
hours the MONARCH OF THE SEAS raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate 
speed of about 12 knots without becoming permanently stranded. Almost immediately 
emergency and abandon ship signals were sounded and the crew and passengers were 
mustered at their abandon ship stations. At 0235 the vessel was intentionally grounded 
on a sandbar in Great Bay, St. Maarten. By 0515 hours all 2,557 passengers were 
safely evacuated ashore by shore based tender vessels. 
 
4.1.1 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 0’ ACCIDENT CODING 
Phase 0 of an accident deals with factors that led to the creation of a dangerous 
situation on board. The involved human and technical subjects are identified and the 
HFACS aspects pertaining to them are coded first. In the chosen case study report the 
three human subjects identified are the captain, staff captain, second officer and the 
one technical subject identified is the navigational aids. The breakdown of the coding 
for the human and technical subjects against the organisational influences, supervision, 
preconditions and unsafe acts is given in table 5 on the following page. The coding is 
done in accordance with the SEMOMAP taxonomy table 0.1 (in line with HFACS) 
which is discussed in detail in chapter 3, section 3.3.1 (pp. 26 – 28). 
 
In the coding for this phase the captain appears 37 times followed by the second officer 
who is coded 19 times and the staff captain who features 11 times. Navigational aids 
as technical subjects have one mention. 
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Table 5: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding 
Source: Student 
*Subject breakdown legend: M – Master; SC – Staff Captain; 2/O – 2nd Officer; B&D – Bridge 
& Deck (technical subject – navigational aids) 
 
4.1.2 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 1’ ACCIDENT CODING 
The factors influencing the creation of a dangerous situation on board are identified in 
the phase 0 coding. Phase 1 of the accident pertains to beginning of the accident. This 
category 
L1 
Sub category L2 Sub-sub category L3 Subject 
breakdown* 
Total 
O
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
Resource 
management 
Lack of human resources 1 M; 1 SC; 
1 2/O 
3 
Organizational 
climate 
Disorganized structure 1 M; 1 SC; 2 
Poor work culture 1 M; 1 SC; 
1 2/O 
3 
Organizational 
process 
Poorly designed operations 2 M; 1 2/O 3 
Inappropriate procedures 1 M 1 
Statutory factors Poor international/ 
national standards 
1 M 1 
                                                              Organizational Influence sub-category total - 13 
S
u
p
er
v
is
io
n
 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Poor shipborne and shore 
supervision 
3 M; 2 SC; 
1 2/O 
6 
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
Poor shipborne operations 2 M; 2 SC; 
2 2/O 
6 
Failed to correct 
known problems 
Shipborne related 
shortcomings 
2 M; 1 SC; 
1 2/O 
4 
Supervisory 
violations 
Shipborne violations 2 M; 1 SC; 
1 2/O 
4 
                                                                                    Supervision sub-category total - 20 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
Environmental 
factors 
Poor technological 
environment 
2 M; 2 2/O; 
1 B&D 
5 
Crew condition Negative cognitive factors 4 M; 2 2/O 6 
Poor physiological state 3 M 3 
Personnel factors Poor crew interaction 3 M; 2 SC; 
1 2/O 
6 
Poor personal readiness 1 M; 1 2/O 2 
                                                                  Preconditions sub-category total - 22 
U
n
sa
fe
 
A
ct
s 
Errors Skill based errors 4 M; 2 2/O 6 
Decision and judgment 
errors  
1 M 1 
Violations Routine 2 M; 2 2/O 4 
Exceptional 1 M; 1 2/O 2 
Unsafe Acts sub-category total - 13 
Coding Total  68 
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phase first involves the identification of the threat to the vessel. On board, it requires 
that the threat is indicated, detected, analysed and appropriate threat mitigation action, 
undertaken. If suitable timely action is taken in this phase, the accident can be avoided 
altogether. The coding for this phase is done in line with chapter 3, section 3.3.2 (pp. 
28 – 30). In the very first instance, the imminent threat to the vessel is coded, which in 
the case of the Monarch of the Seas is the threat of the navigational incident of 
grounding. 
 
Table 6: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.1) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
 
 
After the threat to the vessel is identified, taxonomy table 1.2 and 1.3 are applicable 
which evaluate the threat indication, detection, analysis, and threat prevention action 
with respect to the incident applicable to the vessel. The relevant aspects on board, 
ashore and off-board are evaluated with respect to the equipment involved, human 
involvement and actions undertaken. If an aspect is applicable and not successful, it is 
further evaluated and the human or equipment failure is specified accordingly. In phase 
1 of the Monarch of the Seas grounding accident, the vessel disembarked a sick 
passenger and contrary to procedure, proceeded east of the reef. The staff captain was 
surprised by the master’s choice, however did not say anything.  
 
Table 7: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.2, 1.3) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
N
a
v
ig
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
ci
d
en
t 
- 
G
ro
u
n
d
in
g
 
F
ir
st
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Threat Indication 
O
n
b
o
a
rd
 
 No threat indication   
Threat Detection Human 
Staff 
Captain 
Information 
transmission 
applicable but failed 
Human failure – No threat 
evaluation transmitted. SC did 
not challenge Master’s 
decision. 
Threat Analysis  No threat analysis  
Threat Prevention 
Action 
 No threat prevention 
action 
 
2
n
d
 
Threat Indication Equipment 
Sea Charts 
Information recording 
applicable but failed 
Human failure – No threat 
information recorded. OOW 
failed to plot position 
Risk of 
Navigational incident Grounding 
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In the case of the Monarch of the Seas, the threat is not analysed and no threat 
mitigation action is undertaken which moves the accident into phase 2. Noteworthy is 
that within the same phase, iterations can be carried out based on the number of actions. 
 
4.1.3 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 2’ ACCIDENT CODING 
In phase 2, the accident occurs and losses can be limited by timely and appropriate 
action. In phase 2 for the Monarch of the Seas, the first item to be coded is the nature 
of the accident that has taken place which is the navigational incident of grounding. 
Coding for this phase is carried out according to the phase 2 taxonomy tables discussed 
in detail in chapter 3, section 3.3.3 (pp. 31-32). 
 
Table 8: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.1) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
 
 
 
Subsequent to the accident SEMOMAP taxonomy tables 2.2 and 2.3 are applicable. 
The system health needs to be indicated, detected, analysed and suitable emergency 
response needs to be carried out. For system health indication, detection, analysis and 
emergency response action, the aspects that did not function are identified. If an aspect 
is applicable but unsuccessful, then the equipment or human failure is specified. 
Depending upon the number of emergency actions undertaken in the phase, several 
iterations of taxonomy coding can be carried out. 
 
After the grounding with the reef, in phase 2 of the accident, the system health is 
regularly evaluated and emergency response measures undertaken. Several emergency 
response actions were taken as the vessel faced an added threat of flooding. The 
watertight doors were closed, the speed was reduced and the master decided 
deliberately to ground the vessel on the sandbank to protect lives.  The actions were 
successful and the accident entered into the final evacuation phase. 
 
Accident 
Navigational incident Grounding 
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Table 9: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding 
(SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.2 and 2.3) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
N
a
v
ig
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
ci
d
en
t 
- 
G
ro
u
n
d
in
g
 F
ir
st
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
System Health  
Indication 
O
n
b
o
a
rd
 
 No system health 
indication  
Recording applicable – 
Failed 
Transmission applicable 
- Failed 
Human failure – No info 
recorded/ transmitted 
Ignore system health – 
inadequate risk assessment. 
Omitted action – position 
not plotted, failed to monitor 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
OOW 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
SC 
Information receiving, 
planning & decision 
applicable  
Successful 
Emergency 
Response Action 
Action 
ECR 
Communication, timing 
& sequence and 
selection & quality 
applicable 
Successful 
 
2
n
d
 I
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
System Health  
Indication 
Human 
SC 
Information recording 
& transmission 
applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & 
transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
planning & decision 
applicable  
Successful 
Emergency 
Response Action 
Action 
(Safety 
Officer) 
Communication, timing 
& sequence and 
selection & quality 
applicable 
Successful 
3
rd
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
System Health  
Indication 
Equipment 
Water level 
indicators 
Information recording 
& transmission 
applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
Safety 
Officer 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & 
transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
planning & decision 
applicable  
Successful 
Emergency 
Response Action 
Action 
(ECR) 
Communication, timing 
& sequence and 
selection & quality 
applicable 
Successful 
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4.1.4 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 3’ ACCIDENT CODING 
The Monarch of the Seas entered into the final evacuation phase of the accident after 
the deliberate grounding of the vessel by the master. In this phase SEMOMAP 
taxonomy tables 3.2 and 3.3 are applicable and are discussed in detail in chapter 3, 
section 3.3.4 (pp. 32-34). In this phase emergency response and evacuation come 
foremost and system health indication detection and analysis continue as required. 
Human, equipment and action components both on-board and ashore are evaluated and 
when an aspect is applicable but not successful, then the human or equipment failure 
is clearly specified. All crew and passengers are mustered in this step and taken ashore 
by shore based tenders. The outcome of the accident is that there is severe damage to 
the vessel, however there is no loss of life. After the accident, the timely and suitable 
actions of the master, staff captain, officer of the watch, safety officer, chief engineer 
and crew helped to recover from an otherwise potentially dangerous situation which 
could have resulted in loss of lives (Reason, 2008).  
 
Table 10: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 3’ coding 
(SEMOMAP taxonomy table 3.2 and 3.3) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
N
a
v
ig
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
ci
d
en
t 
- 
G
ro
u
n
d
in
g
 
F
ir
st
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Emergency 
Response & 
Evacuation Action 
O
n
b
o
a
rd
 
Action 
Muster Personnel 
(Emergency 
Team) 
Communication, timing & 
sequence and selection & 
quality applicable 
Successful 
System Health  
Indication 
Human 
OOW 
Information recording & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, planning 
& decision applicable  
Successful 
 
2
n
d
 I
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Emergency 
Response & 
Evacuation Action 
Action 
Drop anchor 
Communication, timing & 
sequence and selection & 
quality applicable 
Successful 
System Health  
Indication 
Human 
OOW 
Information recording & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, planning 
& decision applicable 
Successful 
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3
rd
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Emergency 
Response Action 
Action 
Call SAR services 
Communication, timing & 
sequence and selection & 
quality applicable 
Successful 
System Health  
Indication 
Human 
OOW 
Information recording & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
Human 
Master 
Information receiving, planning 
& decision applicable  
Successful 
 
4
th
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Emergency 
Response Action 
 Action 
(local agents) 
Communication, timing & 
sequence and selection & 
quality applicable 
Successful 
System Health  
Indication 
 Human 
OOW 
Information recording & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
 Human 
Master 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
 Human 
Master 
Information receiving, planning 
& decision applicable  
Successful 
5
th
 i
te
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Emergency 
Response Action 
 Action 
Contain hull 
damage 
Communication, timing & 
sequence and selection & 
quality applicable 
Successful 
System Health  
Indication 
 Human 
OOW 
Information recording & 
transmission applicable  
Successful 
System Health  
Detection 
 Human 
Staff Captain 
Information receiving, 
evaluation & transmission 
Successful 
System Health  
Analysis 
 Human 
Master 
Information receiving, planning 
& decision applicable  
Successful 
 
 
The coding is conducted based on the available information in the accident 
investigation report by the student. Graphical breakdown and results are shown for 
levels 1 to 4a of the taxonomy. Level 4b and 5 have not been analysed graphically, as 
they are reliant and dependant on coder reliability, i.e. different people might disagree 
with the taxonomy options selected for level 4b and 5; instead, however, levels 4b and 
5 are described and discussed very broadly and subjectively.   
 
An indicative fault tree diagram is created for the Monarch of the Seas, by the student 
and is presented on the following page. The diagram reflects the data that can be 
generated by the SEMOMAP model and accompanying taxonomy. SEMOMAP 
generates a more comprehensive output than the fault tree analysis as it is supported 
by two strong accompanying taxonomies.  
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Figure 19: FTA Monarch of the Seas 
Source: Student 
Vessel grounded
Excessive water 
ingress, can't stay 
afloat
Hull damaged
Beyond Repair / 
recovery
AND
Ship collided 
with the rocks
Nos of W/T 
compartment
s damaged
Damage 
exceeds 
design safety 
Unrecoverabl
e damage 
sustained
OR
Failure to 
identify 
hazard
OR
Company 
procedures 
not followed
Unable to A/C 
as per plan
Inadequate 
watch 
keeping
Chart in use
Not corrected
OR
High speed
Master  / 
OOW
Inappropriate 
handover
OR
Failure of 
BTM / BRM
Poor training
Reef 
present
AND
AND
 
 45 
 
4.2 DISSERTATION RESULTS 
The step-by-step coding of the sample case study of the Monarch of the Seas in section 
4.1 is followed by the results of the dissertation. As previously mentioned, this 
dissertation contains the analysis of 15 publicly available accident investigation 
reports, of which 8 on fire, 6 on grounding and 1 on flooding. 14 of the 15 investigated 
reports pertained exclusively to their accident category in question, while Monarch of 
the Seas discussed in 4.1 above was the only one that faced an additional threat of 
flooding after grounding with the reef. To mitigate the threat of flooding and protect 
lives it was decided to deliberately ground the vessel on the sandbank.  
 
The breakdown of the accident outcomes is given below in table 11 
 
Table 11: Accident outcomes of analysed passenger ship investigation reports 
Source: Compiled by Student 
 
Fire Grounding Flooding 
7 Mitigated loss 1 Severe loss 4 Mitigated loss 2 Severe loss 1 Near miss 
8 6 1 
 
None of the passenger ship accidents analysed, resulted in a total loss; no lives were 
lost in these accidents. Table 12 on the following page presents a list of the accident 
investigation reports analysed in the study together with the online sources for the 
reports. This section (4.2) first presents category wise findings specific to Fire, 
grounding and flooding before moving onto overall findings which encompass all the 
three categories. 
 
SEMOMAP allows for the study of actions and processes in the accident context and 
helps identify human contribution, involved equipment and actions that contributed to 
the accident outcomes. Further on in the chapter the findings are collated and presented 
and a separate section is dedicated to the evaluation of the SEMOMAP model itself. 
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Table 12: List of accident investigation reports analyzed 
Source: Student 
No. Ship Name IMO No Flag Classification Nature of accident Report Source 
1 M.V. Zenith 
8918136 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Fire  https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-
2014.aspx 
2 M.V. Azamara Quest 
9210218 Malta Lloyds’ Register Fire https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-
2012.aspx 
3 M.V. Carnival Spirit 
9188647 Malta Lloyds’ Register Fire https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-
2012.aspx 
4 
M.V. Carnival 
Splendor 
9333163 Panama Lloyds’ Register Fire https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?chann
elId=-
18374&contentId=460088&programId=21431&programPage=
%2Fep%2Fprogram%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=13489&cont
entType=EDITORIAL 
5 RMS Queen Mary 2 
9241061 United 
Kingdom 
Lloyds’ Register Fire http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/QM2Report.p
df 
6 M.V. Royal Princess 9210220 Bermuda NA Fire http://www.bermudashipping.bm 
7 M.V. Star Princess 
9192363 Bermuda RINA Fire http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/star%20prince
ss.pdf 
8 M.V. The Calypso 
NA Cyprus Lloyds’ Register Fire http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007
/calypso.cfm?view=print& 
9 M.V. Saga Sapphire 
7822457 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Flooding https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-
2014.aspx 
10 M.V. Lauren L 
9246827 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-
2013.aspx 
11 
M.V. Clipper 
Adventure 
NA Bahamas NA Grounding http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/marine/2010/m10h0006/m10h0006.asp 
12 M.V. Deutschland 
9141807 Germany Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding http://www.bsu-bund.de 
13 M.V. Van Gogh 
7359400 Marshall 
Island 
Det Norske Veritas Grounding http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/
mair/pdf/mair252_001.pdf 
14 M.V. Astor 
8506373 Bahamas Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/
mair/mair200.aspx 
15 
M.V. Monarch of the 
Seas 
8819500 Norway Det Norske Veritas Grounding http://marinecasualty.com/documents/monarch.pdf 
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4.2.1 FLOODING CATEGORY OVERVIEW 
This section discusses the findings from the flooding accident category, of which only 
one report was coded. Table 13, shows the ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding for the flooding 
accident that led to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board. 
 
Table 13: Flooding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS overview  
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Operator: C – Captain; OO – Other Officer; OE – Other Engineer 
 
 
O
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
Sub-Category L2 Sub-Sub Category* 
L3 
Operator 
breakdown 
Total 
Resource Management Lack of human 
resources 
1 C 1 
Organizational Climate Disorganized 
structure 
1 C 1 
Poor work culture 1 C 1 
Organizational Process Poorly designed 
operations 
1 C 1 
Inadequate 
procedures 
1 C 1 
Lack of oversight 1 C 1 
Category total: 6 
S
u
p
er
v
is
io
n
 Inadequate Supervision Poor shipborne and 
shore supervision 
2 C 2 
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
Poor shipborne 
operations 
1 C; 1 OO;  
1 OE 
3 
Supervisory Violations Shipborne violations 2 C; 1 OO 3 
Category total: 8 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s Environmental Factors Poor technological 
environment 
2 C 2 
Crew Condition Negative cognitive 
factors 
1 C; 1 OO;  
1 OE 
3 
Category total: 5 
U
n
sa
fe
 A
ct
s Errors Skill based errors 1 C; 1 OO 2 
 Decision and 
judgment errors 
1 C 1 
Violations Routine 1C; 1 OO 2 
Category total: 5 
Coding Total 24 
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Figure 20: Flooding ‘phase 0’ operator overview 
Source: Student 
 
Table 13 on the preceding page depicts the flooding category overview for HFACS 
coding and figure 20, offers the operator breakdown for each category. The Captain in 
figure 20 appears under all HFACS categories and occupies a large share of each 
category, as can be expected given his overall role on-board. The other operators that 
feature are the Other Officer (exact rank not given in report, but the Officer of the 
Watch) and Other Engineer (most probably the Engine Officer on duty). This finding 
also points to the level of detail included in accident investigation reports regarding 
operators involved.  
 
The background to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board included the poor 
operational practice of utilising the Officer of the Watch for the purpose of ballast 
operations, which was further compounded by a poor hand/take over, thereby 
compromising safety. There was inadequate monitoring from both the deck and the 
engine department. Inadequate SMS guidelines for the operation and inadequate risk 
assessment, led to the dangerous situation of flooding, and the move into phase 1. 
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4.2.1.1 FLOODING ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW 
The flooding had begun, however the accident had not taken place per se and the threat 
indication, detection, analysis and prevention were successfully carried out. 
 
Table 14: Flooding accident category ‘phase 1’ overview (level L2B) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook 
L2B Threat Indication 
On-board Human Other 2 
L2B Threat Detection 
On-board Human OOW 3 
L2B Threat Analysis 
On-board Human OOW 3 
L2B Threat Prevention Action 
On-board Action Other 3 
 
Figure 21: Flooding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4) 
Source: Student 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applicable and Successful Legend 
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In phase one of the flooding accident, the on-board human was applicable 11 times 
and all 11 times was successful. The good practice of on-board safety rounds helped 
the accident to be averted in a timely manner. The vigilant crew during the safety 
round, immediately reported the finding of water build up. The cause of the flooding 
was investigated, ballast operations were stopped and corrective actions taken, which 
prevented the flooding incident from progressing into phase two of the accident.  
 
4.2.2 GROUNDING CATEGORY OVERVIEW 
This sub-section presents the findings of the grounding category of accidents of which 
6 accidents were analysed using SEMOMAP, of which 5 were a mitigated loss and 1 
a severe loss. The HFACS coding for the grounding category for human operators and 
equipments is provided on the following pages.  
 
Most grounding accidents appear to have taken place due to poor communication, 
Bridge Resource Management and Bridge Team Management practices on-board. 
Inadequate risk assessment, passage planning, navigation chart correction and position 
monitoring are some of the aspects that feature in the reports as well as the lack of 
involvement of the personnel on the bridge at the time of the incident (the concerned 
OOW or the pilot, Staff Captain etc.). For instance, a language barrier was identified 
in Astor and Van Gogh grounding in Australia during departure operations as the crew 
on-board were communicating in Russian and Ukrainian whereas the pilot was able to 
understand only English and this was a complete failure of BTM and BRM. 
 
4.2.2.1 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 0’ OVERVIEW 
Table 15 on the following page depicts the coding for the human operators involved 
in the Grounding category according to HFACS and Table 16 presents the technical 
subjects/equipment involved in the grounding accident category.  
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L1 Sub-Category L2 Sub-Sub-Category L3 
Operator Breakdown 
Total C CO 2O OO Helmsman Pilot 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
(i
) 
Resource Management 
Lack of Human Resources 6 4 1 1 0 1 13 
Poor Technological Resources 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Organisational Climate 
Disorganised Structure 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Inadequate Policies 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Poor Work Culture 8 5 2 3 1 3 22 
Poorly Designed Operations 8 0 1 0 0 0 9 
Inappropriate Procedures 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Statutory Factors 
Poor International/National Standards 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Inadequate Flag State Implementation 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
 
(i
i)
 
Inadequate Supervision Poor Shipborne and Shore Supervision 8 3 2 2 0 0 15 
Planned Inappropriate Operations Poor Shipborne Operations 13 7 3 2 0 3 28 
Failed to Correct Known Problems Shipborne Related Shortcomings 8 4 2 0 0 2 16 
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 11 4 2 2 0 0 19 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
(i
ii)
 
Environmental Factors 
Poor Physical Environment 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Poor Technological Environment 3 0 3 1 0 1 8 
Crew Condition 
Negative Cognitive Factors 10 2 3 4 0 1 20 
Poor Physiological State 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Personnel Factors 
Poor Crew Interaction 6 4 1 1 2 2 16 
Poor Personal Readiness 8 3 1 1 2 0 15 
U
n
sa
fe
 
A
ct
s 
(i
v)
 
Errors 
Skill-based errors 16 3 2 3 1 3 28 
Decision and judgement errors 10 1 1 0 0 0 12 
Violations 
Routine 13 5 4 3 1 1 27 
Exceptional 4 1 1 0 0 1 7 
Operator: C-Captain; CO-Chief Officer;  20-2nd Officer; OO; Other Officer   Total 150 47 29 23 7 18 274 
Table 15: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student, according to taxonomy 
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L1 Sub-Category L2 Sub-Sub-Category  L3 
Equipment Breakdown 
Total 
Steering 
Equipment 
Navigation Aids (AIS, 
ECDIS, Radar, GPS, etc.) 
Other 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
 
Resource 
Management 
Poor Technological Resources 0 1 2 3 
Poor Equipment/Facility Resources 
1 0 0 1 
Organisational Climate 
Disorganised Structure 
1 0 0 1 
Inadequate Policies 0 0 1 1 
Poor Work Culture 0 1 2 3 
Organisational Process 
Poorly Designed Operations 
0 0 1 1 
Inappropriate Procedures 0 0 2 2 
Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
  Planned Inappropriate 
Operations Poor Shipborne Operations 
1 0 0 1 
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 
1 0 0 1 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
Environmental Factors 
Poor Physical Environment 1 0 1 2 
Poor Technological Environment 1 1 2 4 
Crew Condition Negative Cognitive Factors 
0 0 1 1 
 Total 6 3 12 21 
Table 16: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student, according to taxonomy 
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Figure 22: Grounding ‘phase 0’ operator overview  
Source: Student 
 
Figure 23: Grounding ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview 
Source: Student 
 
In ‘phase 0’ of the grounding accident category, HFACS categories are attributed 
highest to the Captain, followed by the Chief Officer and 2nd Officer. The HFACS 
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categories are largely attributable to the following equipment – steering equipment, 
navigation aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar, GPS etc.) among others. The taxonomy can 
further be expanded to include these in the future. 
 
4.2.2.2 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW 
The dangerous on board situation contributes to, and leads to the beginning of accident 
‘phase 1’. In case of a grounding accident, threat indication is attributable to equipment 
like ECDIS, Echo Sounder, Radar, Sea charts among others. Threat is detected by the 
human operators – master and others, which includes individuals like the Staff Captain 
and Pilot. The taxonomy can be expanded to include these personnel for future coding 
of accidents. Threat analysis is largely carried out by the master and prevention actions 
include altering speed and manoeuvring.  
 
Figure 24: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2) 
Source: Student based on taxonomy 
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‘Others’ in ‘threat indication’ refers to Staff captain (2 times) and Pilot (4 times). 
‘Others’ in ‘detection’ refers to the Staff captain (6 times) and Pilot (6 times). 73% of 
the times, threat prevention actions are not taken, which moves the accident into the 
next phase of the accident. Levels 3-4 of the SEMOMAP depict the applicability and 
success of threat indication, detection, analysis and threat prevention action. 
 
Figure 25: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
Legend       Applicable & Successful 
                  Applicable & Unsuccessful 
                      Not applicable 
 
A threat not detected and analysed in time, does not have a corresponding mitigation 
action but the threat of an incident does not diminish. This level helps to study the 
applicable aspect and whether it was successful or not. Applicable aspects were 
successful 29 times and unsuccessful 31 times.  
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Level 4-5 of SEMOMAP taxonomy specifies human or equipment failure. Figure 26, 
depicts Level 4-5. This depicts the further breakdown of the ‘orange’ legend – 
‘applicable & unsuccessful’ of figure 25. 
 
Figure 26: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5); Source: Student based on taxonomy 
 
Legend       Human failure specify 
                   
There is no equipment failure in phase 1 (L4-5), human failure has been noted in all 
31 instances at this level. The situation further exacerbates and moves into ‘Phase 2’. 
 
4.2.2.3 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 2’ OVERVIEW 
The accident takes place in this phase and the threat indication changes into the 
indication of system health, after the accident. 
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Figure 27: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
System health is indicated by the equipment such as the water level indicators and 
crew members such as the OOW. System health is detected largely by the Master and 
the OOW. System health analysis is largely carried out by the Master and emergency 
response actions include off board action by shore based tenders to evacuate 
passengers, doing the reverse thrust and deliberately grounding the vessel (Monarch 
of the Seas) among other actions. 
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Figure 28: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
Legend       Applicable & Successful 
                  Applicable & Unsuccessful 
                      Not applicable 
 
Level L3-4 of phase two of the taxonomy helps identify which aspects of system health 
indication, detection, analysis and emergency action were applicable and whether they 
succeeded or not. In phase two of the grounding accident, at this level, there have been 
instances in system health indication, analysis and emergency response action where 
there have been failures. Aspects were applicable and successful 170 times and 
applicable but unsuccessful 30 times. 
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Figure 29: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
Legend       Human failure specify 
 
In level 4-5 of phase 2 taxonomy, the failure can be attributable to the human or 
equipment and in each of the 30 cases of failure specification in grounding, it pertained 
to the human operator as depicted in figure 29 above. An accident moves into the final 
evacuation phase to protect lives and grounding is the only accident category that has 
led to evacuations. Accident categories of fire and flooding have not entered this phase. 
 
4.2.2.4 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 3’ OVERVIEW 
The final ‘phase 3’ pertains to evacuation in an accident situation. In phase 1 and 2 
system health is required to be evaluated to initiate appropriate emergency actions.  
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Figure 30: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L1-2) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
 
 
In an emergency situation arising out of grounding, several measures can be initiated 
like mustering personnel, calling SAR services, tugs, attempting to contain hull 
damage, dropping anchor etc. System health is usually indicated by the personnel on 
the scene like the OOW. It is brought to the attention of senior personnel, the Master 
and in all the grounding cases system analysis is carried out by the Master.  
 
In levels 3-4 of phase 3 taxonomy, aspects are checked for their applicability and 
success. 
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Figure 31: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L3-4) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
Legend       Applicable & Successful 
                   
 
In level 3-4 of phase 3 taxonomy in grounding, in each of the 77 times, the applicable 
aspect has been successful, pointing towards success in post-accident observable 
aspects and actions. As no aspect has been applicable and unsuccessful, the coding 
stops at this point. At this stage, no equipment or human failure is noted and phase 3 
of grounding accidents have led to successful evacuations with no loss of lives. 
 
4.2.3 FIRE CATEGORY OVERVIEW 
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resulted in a mitigated loss and 1 resulted in a severe loss of the vessel. None of the 
fire accidents entered phase 3 – evacuation phase of the accident. Major accidents in 
this category are due to engine room fires, especially auxiliary engine or main engine 
fires. Most of the fires were caused by fuel oil leaks due to loose connections or 
equipment failure. Personnel immediately concerned with fire accidents were the 
OOW and the engineer officer on duty and motorman, among others. The accidents 
have largely occurred due to a failure to comply with standard good engineering 
practice and a failure to comply with equipment/manufacturer’s guidelines. 
 
4.2.3.1 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 0’ OVERVIEW 
The HFACS coding for both human operators and equipment (tables 17 and 18) is 
provided on pages 64 and 65 for this category. 
 
 Figure 32: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student 
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Figure 33: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student 
 
 
 
Figures 32 and 33 above, depict the HFACS categories for operators and equipment 
respectively. Noteworthy in figure 32 is that the HFACS categories of ‘organisational 
influences’ and ‘supervision’ impact the captain most, however in ‘preconditions’, the 
captain is preceded by the chief engineer, who is in-charge of the engine room. Under 
‘unsafe acts’, the captain and chief engineer are equally identified. 
 
The auxiliary engines and the main engine are critical equipment and they are impacted 
along with fuel pumps by the HFACS categories of ‘supervision’, ‘organisational 
influences’ and ‘preconditions’.  
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Table 17: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student according to taxonomy 
L1 Sub-Category L2 Sub-Sub-Category L3 
Operator Break Down 
Total C CO 2O OO AB OS CE 2E OE 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
(i
) 
Resource 
Management 
Lack of Human Resources 
4 1 1 4 2 1 5 4 4 26 
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources 
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Organisational 
Climate 
Disorganised Structure 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Inadequate Policies 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Poor Work Culture 9 2 2 4 2 1 4 3 4 31 
Organisational 
Process 
Inappropriate Procedures 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 9 
Lack of Oversight 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Statutory Factors 
Poor 
International/National 
Standards 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Category Total 86 
Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
 (
ii)
 
Inadequate 
Supervision 
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision 
8 0 1 1 3 2 9 3 1 28 
Planned 
Inappropriate 
Operations 
Poor Shipborne 
Operations 
7 2 0 4 1 2 6 3 3 28 
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems 
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings 
9 3 0 3 1 1 6 2 1 26 
Supervisory 
Violations Shipborne Violations 
6 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 22 
Category Total 104 
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P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
(i
ii)
 
Environmental 
Factors 
Poor Physical Environment 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 
Poor Technological 
Environment 
3 0 0 2 1 1 4 1 1 13 
Crew Condition Negative Cognitive Factors 4 1 1 2 3 2 7 3 5 28 
Personnel Factors 
Poor Crew Interaction 3 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 1 12 
Poor Personal Readiness 
4 1 1 3 2 2 5 4 4 26 
Category Total 74 
U
n
sa
fe
 A
ct
s 
(i
v)
 
Errors 
Skill-based errors 4 2 0 3 1 0 4 2 5 21 
Decision and judgement 
errors 
5 2 1 2 1 1 4 2 5 23 
Perceptual errors 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Violations Routine 6 4 1 6 2 0 6 4 3 32 
Category Total 77 
Total 91 20 9 43 21 14 77 34 42 351 
Operator: C-Captain; CO-Chief Officer; 2O-2nd Officer; OO-Other Officer; AB-Able Seaman; OS-Ordinary Seaman; CE-
Chief Engineer; 2E-2nd Engineer; OE-Other Engineer 
 
Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010) analysed engine room space fires for reporting deficiencies pertaining to organisational factors. The 
researchers found organisational factors were underrepresented, which could in part be due to the investigator applying the stopping 
rule early or there could be a difficulty in understanding and applying IMO guidelines on casualty investigation.  In their research, 
unsafe supervision accounted for 3.8% of the coded items (p. 1190), while in this dissertation, supervision accounts for 30% 
(104/351) in fire accident category and organisational influences account for 24.5% as against their 3.8%. 
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Table 18: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student according to taxonomy 
L1 Sub-Category  L2 Sub-Sub-Category  L3 
Equipment Breakdown 
Total ME AE FO PUMP Other 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
 
Resource Management Poor Equipment/Facility Resources 2 3 0 4 9 
Organisational Climate Poor Work Culture 1 0 0 2 3 
Organisational Process 
Inappropriate Procedures 2 1 0 0 3 
Lack of Oversight 1 0 0 0 1 
Statutory Factors 
Poor International/National 
Standards 
0 0 0 1 1 
Statutory Factors 
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation 
0 0 0 1 1 
Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
  Inadequate Supervision 
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision 
1 0 0 0 1 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations Poor Shipborne Operations 
1 0 0 0 1 
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems Shipborne Related Shortcomings 
0 0 0 1 1 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
 
Environmental Factors 
Poor Physical Environment 
0 2 0 0 2 
Poor Technological Environment 3 2 3 6 14 
Crew Condition Negative Cognitive Factors 0 0 0 1 1 
Personnel Factors Poor Personal Readiness 
0 0 0 1 1 
  Total 
11 8 3 17 39 
Equipment: ME-Main Engine; AE-Auxiliary Engine; FO Pump-Fuel Oil Pump 
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4.2.3.2 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW 
In ‘phase 1’ of the fire, the indication of the threat is given by the equipment (CCTV, 
alarms etc.) and human operators. The threat is largely detected by personnel on watch 
keeping duty, who also analyse the threat and initiate threat mitigation action. 
 
Figure 34: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2); Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
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Threat mitigation actions in this phase usually include closing fire doors, cutting 
oxygen supply to the area and shutting down engines among others.  
 
Figure 35: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
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                      Not applicable 
 
‘Phase 1’ level 3-4, codes information related aspects, planning, decision making and 
action and identifies if they were successful or not. According to the analysis, 104 
times an aspect was applicable and successful while 47 times an applicable aspect was 
unsuccessful. ‘Phase 1’ level attributes the failure to human or equipment (see figure 
36 on page 69). 
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Figure 36: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5) 
Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
 
Legend       Human failure, specify 
 
In phase 1, in each of the 47 instances, the failure was attributable to human operators. 
Lack of success in phase 1, moves an accident into the next accident phase in which 
the system health has to be evaluated after the accident has taken place. 
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4.2.3.3 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 2’ OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 37: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2); Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
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In phase 2 (L1-2), once the fire has taken place, the system health is detected by various 
on-board equipment like the fire alarms, heat detector, smoke detector, CCTV and 
cameras. However it is noteworthy that the system health indication is largely 
attributed to the human operators on duty, which are the officer of the watch and the 
engineer officer on watch, who also detect system health. Unlike phase 1 which is the 
beginning phase of the accident, in phase 2 the incident has progressed. While in phase 
1, the threat analysis was largely conducted by the officers on site, in phase 2 the threat 
analysis is predominantly carried out by the master and a host of emergency response 
actions are carried out. Level 3-4 analyse the applicability and success and failure of 
aspects of information (recording, transmission, receiving, and evaluation), planning 
and decision and emergency response action. 
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Figure 38: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4); Source: Student, based on taxonomy 
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Figure 38 shows that in 50 instances an aspect was applicable and unsuccessful and 
there were a total of 629 instances when an aspect was applicable and successful.  
 
Figure 39: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5); Source: Student, based on taxonomy                   
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In level 4-5 of ‘phase 2’ of the fire accident category, the failures of the preceding level 
are specified to equipment or the human operator. In this phase of the fire accident out 
of a total of 50 failures, 2 are attributable to equipment failure and 48 to human 
operators.  
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Although all of the vessels in the fire accident category were in compliance with 
SOLAS equipment and certification requirements, however a number of times these 
certificates have been issued without adequate verification and by cutting the corners 
with respect to the safety checks. For e.g. Queen Mary 2, Harmonic Filters were not 
tested during Continuous Survey of Machinery (CSM) surveys as required and failure 
of this impacted the accident after almost two months (MAIB, 2011, p. 32). In the case 
of M.V. Calypso, CO2 system was not tested as required and CO2 failed to release 
during engine room fire. On investigation it was found that even the procedure posted 
on-board were incorrect. Majority of the fire accidents on-board were due to the fuel 
oil leakage in Auxiliary engines or Main engine. Which was largely due to the failure 
to comply with standard good engineering practices during routine and non-routine 
maintenance work. An aspect was the failure to comply with equipment / 
manufacturers guidelines when overhauling or replacing / refitting the damaged parts 
or leaking pipes. This also highlights inadequate training trends for engineers who 
failed to refer to equipment manual during inspection and investigation of leaks or 
failed to consult senior engineers in case of doubt, for  e.g. M.V. Azamara Quest (MSI, 
2013, p. 14, p. 22). Inadequate Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) also impacted the 
accident, for e.g. Queen Mary 2, in which the Hi Fog system was fitted in 
compartments containing the high voltage system.  
 
All of the fire accidents finished in stage two due to good response from duty 
engineers, officers of the watch as well as due to modern automatic firefighting 
equipment on some ships which contributed positively. However at times due to lack 
of training or a failure to understand the equipment / system limitations have resulted 
in failure to contain the fire, for e.g. M.V. Carnival Splendor accident report (USCG, 
2013, p. 6), where OOW performed a general reset on the fire detection system and by 
doing so, the Hi-Fog system failed to activate automatically as it was designed to avoid 
time delay. This initial mitigation measure could have contained the fire from 
spreading, provided the OOW was aware of the system limitation.  
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4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF ALL 3 CATEGORIES – FLOODING, GROUNDING AND FIRE 
This section combines the results obtained from all three accident categories and provides an overview of the findings. 
Table 19: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) operator overview; Source: Student based on taxonomy 
L1 Sub-Category L2 Sub-Sub-Category L3 
Total Operator Break Down 
Total C CO 2O OO AB OS H P CE 2E OE 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
(i
) 
Resource 
Management 
Lack of Human 
Resources 
11 5 2 5 2 1 0 1 5 4 4 40 
Poor Technological 
Resources 
2           2 
Poor Equipment / 
Facility Resources 
2 0 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 3 
Organisational 
Climate 
Disorganised Structure 2 1 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 4 
Inadequate Policies 3 0 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 4 
Poor Work Culture 18 7 4 7 2 1 1 3 4 3 4 54 
Organisational 
Process 
Poorly Designed 
Operation 
9  1         10 
Inappropriate 
Procedure 
7           7 
Inappropriate 
Procedures 
4 0 0 2 0 0   2 0 1 9 
Lack of Oversight 6 1 0 1 0 0   0 0 0 8 
Statutory Factors 
Poor 
International/National 
Standards 
4 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 4 
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation 
6 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 6 
Category Total 151 
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Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
 (
ii)
 
Inadequate 
Supervision 
Poor Shipborne and 
Shore Supervision 
18 3 3 3 3 2   9 3 1 45 
Planned 
Inappropriate 
Operations 
Poor Shipborne 
Operations 
21 9 3 7 1 2  3 6 3 4 59 
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems 
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings 
17 7 2 3 1 1  2 6 2 1 42 
Supervisory 
Violations Shipborne Violations 
19 5 3 6 2 1   2 3 3 44 
Category Total 190 
P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
(i
ii)
 
Environmental 
Factors 
Poor Physical 
Environment 
1 0 0 0 0 0   4 0 1 6 
Poor Technological 
Environment 
8 0 3 3 1 1  1 4 1 1 23 
Crew Condition 
Negative Cognitive 
Factors 
15 3 4 7 3 2  1 7 3 6 51 
Poor Physiological State 3           3 
Personnel Factors 
Poor Crew Interaction 9 4 1 4 0 0 2 2 5 0 1 28 
Poor Personal Readiness 
12 4 2 4 2 2 2  5 4 4 41 
Category Total 152 
U
n
sa
fe
 A
ct
s 
(i
v)
 
Errors 
Skill-based errors 21 5 2 7 1 0 1 3 4 2 5 51 
Decision and judgement 
errors 
16 3 2 2 1 1   4 2 5 36 
Perceptual errors 0 0 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 1 
Violations 
Routine 20 9 5 10 2 0 1 1 6 4 3 61 
Exceptional 4 1 1     1    7 
Category Total 156 
Total 258 67 38 71 21 14 7 18 77 34 44 649 
Operator: C-Captain; 2O-2nd Officer; OO-Other Officer; AB-Able Seaman; OS-Ordinary Seaman; H-Helmsman; P-Pilot; CE-Chief Engineer; 2E-2nd Engineer; OE-Other Engineer 
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 Table 19 on the preceding page provides an overview of all the 15 passenger ship 
accidents coded for the dissertation under the ‘phase 0’ HFACS adapted taxonomy. A 
total of 649 items were coded, of which a third were coded under the supervision 
category (190, 30%), followed by unsafe acts (156, 24%), preconditions (152, 23%) 
and organisational influences (151, 23%). 
 
Figure 40: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ HFACS category overview                   
Source: Student  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All the subcategories under supervision – inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problems and supervisory violations 
were coded highly. Under organisational influences, the category of poor work culture 
was coded 54 times, which is a cause for concern. Under the category of preconditions, 
negative cognitive factors were coded 51 times and under the category of unsafe acts, 
skill based errors were coded 51 times and routine violations 61 times. Poor work 
culture will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
The captain was coded 258 times out of 649 (40%), followed by the chief engineer 
(12%), other officer (11%) and chief officer (10%). 
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Table 20: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) equipment overview 
Source: Student based on taxonomy 
1 Sub-Category  L2 Sub-Sub-Category  L3 
Total Equipment Breakdown 
Total 
ME AE FO PUMP  Other Navigation Aids (AIS, 
ECDIS, Radar, GPS, etc.) 
Steering 
Equipment 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
 In
fl
u
en
ce
s 
(i
) 
Resource 
Management 
Poor Technology Resource    2 1  3 
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources 
2 3 0 4  1 10 
Organisational Climate 
Disorganized Structure    1  1 2 
Inadequate Policies        
Poor Work Culture 1 0 0 4 1  6 
Organisational Process 
Poorly Designed Operation 
   1   1 
Inappropriate Procedures 2 1 0 2   5 
Lack of Oversight 1 0 0 0   1 
Statutory Factors 
Poor International / 
National Standards 
0 0 0 1   1 
Statutory Factors 
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation 
0 0 0 1   1 
Organisational Influences Category Total: 30 
Su
p
er
vi
si
o
n
 (
ii)
 
Inadequate 
Supervision 
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision 
1 0 0 0   1 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
Poor Shipborne 
Operations 
1 0 0 0  1 2 
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 
     1 1 
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems 
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings 
0 0 0 1   1 
Supervision Category Total: 5 
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P
re
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
(i
ii)
 
Environmental Factors 
Poor Physical Environment 
0 2 0 1  1 4 
Poor Technological 
Environment 
3 2 3 8 1 1 18 
Crew Condition Negative Cognitive Factors 0 0 0 2   2 
Personnel Factors Poor Personal Readiness 0 0 0 1   1 
Preconditions Category Total: 25 
Total 
11 8 3 29 3 6 60 
 
A total of 60 items were coded in the ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding for technical subjects (equipment). Organisational influences were 
coded the highest (30, 50%), followed by preconditions (25, 41%) and supervision (5, 9%). Under organisational influences, 
attention needs to be paid to the subcategory of poor equipment/facility resources which was coded 10 times (17%). Under 
preconditions, sub-sub category of poor technological environment received a high coding of 18 (30%) which would further need 
to be evaluated.  
 
Among the equipment, the main engine (11, 18%) and the auxiliary engines (8, 13%) received a high coding. A high 50% of 
equipment coded available under the ‘other’ equipment category. The raw data pertaining to the other equipment would be used to 
expand the SEMOMAP taxonomy. 
 
Table 21 on the following page provides an overview of all three accident categories in all the three phases for taxonomy level 3-4 
and 4-5 evaluation. The table shows that the fire accident category went into two phases and the bulk of the effort is concentrated in 
‘phase 2’. The table also shows that the flooding accident finished within ‘phase 1’ itself. 
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Table 21: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 evaluation; Source: Student 
N
o 
Nature of 
Accident 
Phase Stages Number of 
Subjects 
Number of 
events 
process fail/safe status Failure 
source 
 
      Safe Fail Not 
Applicable 
Human 
Failure 
Equipment 
Failure 
1 Fire Phase-1 Threat Indication 6 28 28 0 0 0 0 
   Threat Detection 2 42 34 8 0 8 0 
   Threat Analysis 3 42 28 14 0 14 0 
   Threat Prevention Action 5 42 14 25 3 25 0 
  Phase-2 System Health Indication 9 124 124 0 0 0 0 
   System Health Detection 3 186 183 3 0 3 0 
   System Health Analysis 3 186 174 12 0 12 0 
   Emergency Response Action 9 186 148 35 3 33 2 
  Phase-3 Emergency Response & Evacuation Action  0      
   System Health Indication  0      
   System Health Detection  0      
   System Health Analysis  0      
2 Flooding Phase-1 Threat Indication 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 
   Threat Detection 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 
   Threat Analysis 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 
   Threat Prevention Action 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 
  Phase-2 System Health Indication  0      
   System Health Detection  0      
   System Health Analysis  0      
   Emergency Response Action  0      
  Phase-3 Emergency Response & Evacuation Action  0      
   System Health Indication  0      
   System Health Detection  0      
   System Health Analysis  0      
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The grounding accident category in table 21 above shows that the accident entered into the third phase of evacuation and the bulk 
of efforts were concentrated in ‘phase 2’. 
 
Table 22 on the following page presents an overview of each time a human operator was applicable and successful or unsuccessful 
and each time an equipment was applicable and successful or unsuccessful.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 Grounding Phase-1 Threat Indication 6 20 11 3 6 3 0 
   Threat Detection 3 30 9 9 12 9 0 
   Threat Analysis 2 30 4 9 17 9 0 
   Threat Prevention Action 2 33 5 10 18 10 0 
  Phase-2 System Health Indication 5 36 32 2 2 2 0 
   System Health Detection 3 54 53 0 1 0 0 
   System Health Analysis 3 54 42 11 1 11 0 
   Emergency Response Action 3 60 43 17 0 17 0 
  Phase-3 Emergency Response & Evacuation Action 6 21 21 0 0 0 0 
   System Health Indication 2 14 14 0 0 0 0 
   System Health Detection 2 21 21 0 0 0 0 
   System Health Analysis 1 21 21 0 0 0 0 
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Table 22: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 evaluation 
Source: Student 
 
Table 22 shows that the equipment only failed 2 times when applicable and the human 
operator failed 156 times (13%) and succeeded 1020 times (87%). Timing is crucial in 
on-board accident situations. The success of the human operators in phase 1 of the 
flooding incident averted a more serious accident and the successes of the human 
operators in ‘phase 2’ of the fire accident category prevented the fire accidents from 
going further into the next evacuation accident phase. Failure in a phase leads the 
accident to progress to the next subsequent phase, however the analysis shows that the 
recovery from accidents is creditable to the successes of human operators (Reason, 
2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Phase Human operator Equipment Total 
  Applicable Applicable  
  Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful  
Flooding Phase 1 11    11 
Fire Phase 1 104 47   151 
 Phase 2 629 48  2 679 
Grounding Phase 1 29 31   60 
 Phase 2 170 30   200 
 Phase 3 77    77 
Total  1020 156  2 1178 
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Table 23: Timelines: all accident categories across all phases 
Source: Student 
Category Vessel Name Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Flooding M.V. Saga Sapphire 00H 02M 00S -- -- 
Total 2 Min   
Fire M.V. Azamara Quest 00H 03M 00S 00H 01M 29S -- 
M.V. Carnival Spirit -- -- -- 
M.V. Carnival 
Splendor 
00H 02M 00S 09H 13M 00S -- 
RMS Queen Mary 2 00H 36M 00S 00H 24M 00S -- 
M.V. Royal Princess 00H 00M 45S 04H 32M 00S -- 
M.V. Star Princess 00H 19M 00S 01H 27M 00S -- 
M.V. The Calypso NA 00H 38M 00S -- 
M.V. Zenith 00H 20 M 00S  01H 28M 00S -- 
 Total 80 Min 45 Sec 17 Hr 43 Min  
 Average time 13 Min 2 Hr 31 Min  
Grounding M.V. Lauren L 01H 17M 00S Not mentioned Not mentioned 
M.V. Clipper 
Adventure 
00H 32 M 00S Not mentioned Not mentioned 
M.V. Deutschland 00H 06M 15S 00H 08M 37S -- 
M.V. Van Gogh 00H 02M 00S 00H 03M 00S -- 
M.V. Astor 00H 04M 00S 00H 03M 00S -- 
M.V. Monarch of the 
Seas 
00H 03M 00S 01 H 05 M 00S 02H 55M 
 Total 2 H 4 M 15 S 1 H 19 M 37 S 2 H 53 M 
 Average time 20 Min 20 Min 2 H 53 M 
 
Table 23 depicts the timelines applicable to all phases across all accidents. It can be 
seen that the time in phase 1 for the flooding accident category was only two minutes 
and the accident did not progress further. In the fire accident category, the bulk of the 
efforts were concentrated in phase 2 with an average of 2 hours and 31 minutes and 
the accident not progress to the evacuation phase. In the grounding accident category, 
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phase 1 and 2 took an average of 20 minutes each. It is noteworthy that the average of 
the grounding accident category for phase 2 is distorted as one vessel, M.V. Monarch 
of the Seas had a high phase 2 timeline of one hour and five minutes which affected 
the average. Going by the other three vessels that have provided timelines for 
grounding (M.V. Deutschland, M.V. Van Gogh and M.V. Astor), the phase 2 timeline 
in grounding accidents is between 3 and 8 minutes. M.V. Monarch of the Seas moved 
into phase 3 of evacuation and therefore spend considerable time in both phases 2 and 
3. The other two vessels that evacuated passengers (M.V. Lauren L and M.V. Clipped 
Adventurer), did not mention timelines for phases 2 and 3 and therefore the timeline 
analysis is incomplete. It is to be noted that the timeline analysis is not robust as all of 
the accident investigation reports had not mentioned clear timelines. This analysis is 
indicative of the insights one can gain if standardised reporting procedures include 
timelines in the reports. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the findings of the dissertation across all accident 
categories, phases and taxonomy levels according to the SEMOMAP accident 
investigation model and its complementary taxonomy. The following chapter reflects 
on the findings. 
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5 DISSERTATION REFLECTIONS  
This chapter reflects upon the findings of the dissertation and discusses how the 
research questions have been answered in the dissertation. 
 
5.1 REFLECTION ON SEMOMAP 
SEMOMAP as a maritime accident investigation model has tremendous potential. It 
is extremely useful to consider the accident process to reveal insights that could help 
us ultimately to learn from accidents and prevent them from recurring in the future.  
SEMOMAP is a robust model that incorporates both HFACS and TRACEr 
taxonomies, allowing for the identification of factors impinging on the accident 
situation removed in time. However, worthwhile to note here is that the analysis 
utilising SEMOMAP is largely dependent on the quality of the accident investigation 
report, which will be discussed further in this chapter 
 
The SEMOMAP taxonomy can be further expanded to be more comprehensive and 
specific. It could include other ranks on-board to make it more specific. In case of 
passenger ships they have other staff which is not reflected in the taxonomy (e.g. Staff 
Captain, Customer service, Safety officer, Staff Chief Engineer, Hotel Staff, etc.). In 
the electronic database platform created in MaRiSa, WMU to facilitate SEMOMAP 
coding, ‘other’ additional human operators are not included in the category as it 
accepts the first entry. This can be resolved to be more specific about the ‘other’ human 
operators involved.  
 
Muster passengers and muster crew should be depicted separately in the taxonomy as 
these are two different actions most of the times and occur at different time intervals. 
Under communication, the urgency message / distress message can be included in the 
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taxonomy. The critical equipment list can be expanded to be more exclusive as most 
of the time these are involved in the accident (quick closing valves, harmonic filters, 
etc.). 
 
The taxonomy could consider including MAIB, NTSB, USCG etc. under the 
investigating authorities. Analysis of the report depends upon the quality of the 
investigation report as well as the investigator and assessor, as many reports may be 
investigated by a technical expert who has none or limited in depth training on Human 
element or factors. So he/she is likely to miss out key human element or human factors 
issues which may have contributed to the accident or incident. Therefore it is 
imperative to follow a uniform standard for accident investigation where all aspects 
are covered / approached with equal importance. It is worth noting that investigation 
reports conducted by USCG and ATSB are much more comprehensive than other 
reports which were conducted by some flag states. When analysing these reports one 
gets a much broader and clearer picture about the various contributory factors. A 
research on various investigating bodies and a comparison of their findings itself will 
be highly valuable and can contribute positively in drawing future guidelines for 
accident investigation of the IMO. 
 
The NTSB is an independent governmental agency charged with determining the 
probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety in the 
United States, whereas in some other states it may not be the same and they might not 
be in a position to conduct similar independent investigations due to lack of freedom.  
 
For further validation of SEMOMAP, professional researchers from different 
spectrum of the industry must be considered (operational, academics, inspectors etc.). 
They should be given similar case studies for the analysis and the outcome must be 
compared for further improvement and amendment. This will help in making the 
model more robust to meet diverse complex requirements. 
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5.2 REFLECTION ON RESULTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
All the research questions, the student had identified in the beginning of the 
dissertation have been adequately answered in the preceding chapters. This section 
provides a reflection on them. 
 
 Is the maritime industry specific SEMOMAP suitable to explore maritime 
accidents?  
This research question has been answered adequately in chapter 4 on the 
analysis of accident investigation reports. The model has undergone 
comprehensive testing and evaluation in the analysis of 15 accident 
investigation reports and has served the student well by not being generic but 
rather specific to the maritime domain with a nuanced understanding of its 
language, personnel, operations, equipment and shipboard and shore based 
dimensions.  
 
 What is it about the unique unfolding of the accident process on board and 
the shipboard behaviours and barriers, if any, that can lead to different 
accident outcomes for different accidents.  
The time of reaction to a developing dangerous situation and corresponding 
evaluation of applicable and successful/unsuccessful aspects leads to different 
outcomes for different vessels. The majority of the fire accidents were the 
result of inadequate investigation of the underlying causes by the responsible 
engineers and failure to comply with standard procedures. This occurred 
despite frequent break down and parameter alarms (e.g. M.V. Carnival 
Splendor (USCG, 2013)) where auxiliary engine frequently tripped due to 
overload and torsional vibration alarm from the equipment. In another case of 
M.V. Azamara Quest (MSI, 2013), the auxiliary engine was made to run on 
load directly after the repair was performed for fuel oil leakage and without 
conducting any test run as necessary to ensure that the repair was successful. 
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Accident investigation with a focus on the involved processes and actions 
reveals unique insights into on-board work culture. The case of M.V. Azamara 
Quest, highlights that the accident could have been completely averted in 
‘phase 1’ itself if the motor man who had detected the fuel oil leak had the 
authority to tackle it locally. He reported the risk to the second engineer on the 
VHF who came down to confirm the source of the leak and assess the situation 
and then decided to stop the generator remotely from the control room instead 
of locally taking care of the risk. This costly time delay resulted in a full-
fledged fire incident which resulted in a severe loss to the vessel. This aspect 
highlights among others, the lack of authority of the lower ranked motor man 
to deal with issues locally; the complacency of the second engineer which 
resulted in loss of time and poor decision of the second engineer to remotely 
turn off the generator. This is especially more important when given the fact 
that most of the fire accidents were caused due to fuel oil leakage. Any leakage 
from critical equipment with hot surfaces around, should be dealt with, without 
any time delay. However, in some cases where vigilant crew responded swiftly, 
they managed to contain the fire and loss was mitigated. This highlights that 
good practices and additional barriers on-board can certainly help in mitigating 
loss.  
 
 What are the common processes in emergency situations on-board in case 
of fire, grounding and flooding? 
In majority of the cases they followed the routine SMS procedures for the 
particular emergency, however at times failed to comply with the same which 
could be due to lack of training and/or complacency, among other factors. In 
case of flooding no claims can be made about common processes as only one 
accident was analysed under the category. In fire it is noteworthy that in all 
accidents the first phase is relatively short and if the threat is not detected and 
mitigated swiftly, it develops quickly into an accident and enters ‘phase 2’. It 
is noteworthy that in most firefighting accidents, ‘phase 2’ is long as the bulk 
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of the firefighting efforts are concentrated in this phase.  In the grounding 
accident category, most of the accidents have a short phase 1 and a short phase 
2. It can be safely assumed that they would then have a longer phase 3 as that 
would involve evacuation.  
 
 How much time is available to recover from an emergency situation 
during the different phases of the accident? 
 
The majority of the accident investigation reports do not provide a very good 
time line and therefore it is difficult to make claims related to time analysis. 
However this is a potential aspect that SEMOMAP allows to be evaluated. 
 
 How realistic is the time limit of 30 minutes required for abandoning ship, 
post breach of threshold.  
 
All three vessels that conducted evacuations only did it for the passengers and 
no timelines are provided for crew transfer. M.V. Monarch of the Seas had 2557 
passengers and 831 Crew members, M.V. Clipper Adventurer 128 passengers 
and 69 Crew members on-board and M.V. Lauren L had only 38 passengers 
and the number of crew member was not mentioned in the report. They 
remained on-board for further duration.  
 
o M.V. Clipper Adventurer 
The grounding incident occurred on 27th Aug at 1832 Lt and all passengers 
were mustered at 1910 Lt, which is almost after 38 minutes delay and since the 
vessel was firmly aground; after assessing the situation, passengers were asked 
to stand down at approximately 2030 Lt. The total number of passengers on-
board at the time of the incident was 128 and 69 crew. The passengers were 
transferred to another vessel on the 29th August at 1000 Lt. 
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Although the passengers were transferred safely from all ships however the 
time taken to transfer them was not clearly defined and certainly it was much 
more than the 30 minutes time window as required by the IMO.   
 
One of the observations made during this analysis is that during most of these 
emergencies, the passengers were not updated and mustered immediately after 
the accident. This can lead to a dangerous situation as it is difficult to hide an 
impact or blackout on-board. Waiting till the last minute, keeping the 
passengers uninformed can cause panic and uncertainty. Therefore, it is 
recommended that whenever there is an accident on-board, it is imperative to 
muster the crew and passengers without delay, and continue system 
assessments as appropriate. In case the situation is not so serious the passengers 
and crew can be stood down later on.    
 
o M.V. Monarch of the Seas 
The grounding incident occurred on 15th December at 0130 Lt and all the 
passengers were mustered at 0148 Lt. The portside lifeboats were lowered at 
0210 and STBD side at 0215. However after assessing the damage the master 
decided to ground the vessel intentionally at 0235 Lt this was done to minimise 
the chances of flooding and foundering. Since vessel was close to the port the 
master decided to use tenders for transferring passengers from the ship to shore. 
At 0245 first tender came alongside and at 0519 they completed the passenger 
disembarkation operation. The operation took around 02h 34m which is much 
more than the IMO’s limit of 30 minutes and this is when the vessel was resting 
on the reef.  The total number of passengers on-board at the time of incident 
was 2557 and 831 crew members.  
 
o M.V. Lauren L 
M.V. Lauren L had only 38 passengers and the number of crew members 
number was not mentioned in the report. They remained on-board for further 
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duration. The timeline for the transfer operation is also not mentioned in the 
report.  
 
With a limited number of evacuation incidents, it is difficult to confirm the 
validity of the IMO’s time requirement, however, in the above accidents it 
certainly took much more time to evacuate the passengers as compared to the 
30 minute time limit. Delay in mustering the passengers is a major cause for 
concern and this approach highlights the lack of training and standardised 
procedures in such an emergency. This needs to be highlighted further to create 
mandatory procedures to ensure that passengers are informed and mustered 
without delay in case of an incident or accident on-board. 
 
5.3 SUMMARY 
Reports from NTSB, USCG, MAIB and BSU covered the investigation in depth 
whereas some other administration and investigating agency reports were shallow 
without adequate timeline or further information. A majority of the accidents were 
attributed to human error and SEMOMAP has the strength to investigate how humans 
mitigate accidents on-board.  Accident investigation reports should include the 
positive human contribution and support SEMOMAP in studying this aspect. In some 
cases the reports have highlighted the need of further training etc., but unfortunately 
these accidents were found to be recurring on ships supposedly manned by well-trained 
officers and crew. The question is, are we looking in the right direction? If so, why are 
we unable to minimize these accidents? And what needs to be improved so that we can 
get positive results on a global level?  
 
SEMOMAP is a step in the right direction with respect to maritime accident 
investigation and should be utilised to study accident cases to reveal comprehensive 
insights into accident processes and what action we might recommend at which stage 
to stop the situation from escalating further. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The SEMOMAP model and its accompanying taxonomy are robust for the purpose of 
maritime accident investigation. Most of the accidents analysed in this dissertation 
highlight a lack of inadequate risk assessment and non-compliance with SMS in line 
with the ISM code. The results revealed among other issues, a poor work culture on-
board and negative cognitive attitudes. It is important to sensitise the shipping industry 
and academic community to HFACS aspects in connection with on-board accident 
processes which can be analysed with SEMOMAP. This can help us to understand 
recovery from accident situations and help us to learn in detail about accident 
processes, in addition to the other factors impacting the accidents.  
 
Given the dissertation findings, effective implementation of rules and regulations like 
the ISM code is essential for increasing overall safety and reducing risk on-board 
ships2. The theme for the 2014 World Maritime day is the effective implementation of 
IMO conventions (IMO, 2014b). Mandatory compliance is required with the ISM with 
the introduction of chapter IX into SOLAS - “Management for the Safe Operation of 
Ships”. The ISM code links the flag, the owner and the vessel  and requires a 
customized SMS tailored to suit the company needs to improve on-board safety 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
 
Regarding the ISM code, Bhattacharya (2012a, p. 528) found ‘a wide gap between its 
intended purpose and practice’. The researcher found a lack of seafarers’ participation 
and the underlying causal factors were located in poor employment conditions and low 
trust relationships. 
                                                          
2 A previous version on the implementation of the ISM code has been submitted by the student for 
MSEA 253, Maritime Human Element assignment. 
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Learning from incidents on board is essential to enhance shipboard safety. The self-
regulatory nature of the ISM code requires for shipboard incidents to be reported, 
investigated and analyzed (Bhattacharya, 2012b, p. 4). Batalden & Sydnes (2014) 
found that the main challenges pertained to four sections of the ISM code: Section 5 – 
Master’s responsibility; Section 6 – resources and personnel; Section 7 – development 
of plans for shipboard operation and Section 12 – company, verification, review and 
evaluation. The findings of the HFACS coding of this dissertation are in a similar 
direction and need to be addressed to contribute to the on-board safety culture. 
 
The ISM code has contributed to safety (Heijari and Tapaninen, 2010) and should be 
effectively implemented to reap the benefits. There is a link between the 
organizational safety climate and employee safety compliance which leads to 
increased employee participation and reduction in accidents (Clarke, 2006). 
Management of shipboard safety requires building and sustaining a safety culture on 
board (Havold, 2010, Ek et al., 2014). Company and on-board implementation of the 
ISM code should address the safety of shipping by taking into account the human 
element (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
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Appendix 1: Detail list of accident investigation reports 
No Ship Name IMO No Flag Classification Nature of 
accident 
Narrative and report Source  
1 M.V. Zenith 8918136 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Fire  On 25 June 2013, at 0335, the fire alarm sounded in the engine-room of the 
Maltese registered passenger ship Zenith. Upon investigation, a fire was 
noticed on the starboard father main engine. The seat of the fire was between 
the turbocharger and cylinder head no. 1. Immediate actions were taken by 
the crew members to contain the fire and ensure the safety of all persons on 
board. The safety investigation identified that the immediate cause of the fire 
was the fracture of a low carbon steel pipe on a fuel damping cylinder 
assembly on the starboard father main engine. This fracture led to the release 
of gas oil, at a pressure of about 6 bars, which sprayed on an exposed high 
temperature area of the main engine exhaust gas manifold. The MSIU has 
issued one recommendation to the Company intended to enhance the vessels 
maintenance regime vis-à-vis all the critical equipment installed in the 
machinery spaces. 
 
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2014.aspx 
2 M.V. Azamara 
Quest 
9210218 Malta Lloyds’ 
Register 
Fire  On 30 March 2012, Azamara Quest departed Manila, Philippines for 
Sandakan, Malaysia as her next planned call on her cruise itinerary. There 
were 1001 persons on board, i.e. 590 passengers and 411 crew members. At 
around 2000, a fire broke out on diesel generator no. 4 whilst it was being 
tested following repairs on a leaking fuel oil return pipe. The prime mover was 
shut down, and the low pressure water mist firefighting system automatically 
activated. The fuel oil quick closing valves were closed and the ventilation to 
the engine-room stopped. Thereafter, at 2006, the vessel suffered a complete 
blackout as all the other generator engines stopped working. The crew and 
passengers were mustered and the crew fire parties entered the main engine-
room to assess the fire. At about 2043, the staff chief engineer reported that 
the fire had been extinguished and thereafter, some fire doors and shell doors 
were subsequently opened to ventilate the heavy smoke out of the affected 
area. Power to Azamara Quest’s engines was restored in the evening of 31 
March and the vessel resumed her passage at slow speed. She entered 
Sandakan Harbour on 01 April with one crew member in a critical condition as 
a result of smoke inhalation. 
 
 
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2012.aspx 
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3 M.V. Carnival 
Spirit 
9188647 Malta Lloyds’ 
Register 
Fire  At 1818 (LT) on 30 December 2012, a fire broke out in the women sauna room 
of the passenger vessel Carnival Spirit, whilst en route from Mystery Island, 
Vanuatu to Sydney Australia. Automatic fire/heat detection devices activated 
and alerted the crew. Although the fire was contained inside the sauna room, 
the fixed water dry sprinkler system did not activate and the fire was 
extinguished manually. The safety investigation has concluded that the fire 
was caused by the placement of the women’s sauna wooden cedar floor grate 
on top of the frame work surrounding the sauna’s heating element/hot stones. 
An examination of the dry sprinkler pipe and check valve revealed that the 
latter was blocked in the closed position and did not open due to 
corrosion/oxidation of the valve seat. The safety investigation has also found 
that there were no specific maintenance records for the fixed dry sprinkler 
system in the sauna. In view of the safety actions taken by the ship managers, 
no recommendations have been made. 
 
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2012.aspx 
 
4 M.V. Carnival 
Splendor 
9333163 Panama Lloyds’ 
Register 
Fire  On November 8, 2010 at 0600 (Local Time), the Carnival Splendor was 
underway off the coast of Mexico when the vessel suffered a major mechanical 
failure in the number five diesel generator. As a result, engine components, 
lube oil and fuel were ejected through the engine casing and caused a fire at 
the deck plate level between generators five and six in the aft engine room 
which eventually ignited the cable runs overhead. The fire in the cable runs 
was relatively small, but produced a significant volume of smoke which 
hampered efforts to locate and extinguish it. In addition, the fire caused 
extensive damage to the cables in the aft engine room, which contributed to 
the loss of power. Post casualty analysis of the event revealed that the 
installed Hi-Fog system for local protection was activated 15 minutes after the 
initial fire started. This delay was the result of a bridge watch stander resetting 
the fire alarm panel on the bridge. This was a critical error which allowed the 
fire to spread to the overhead cables and eventually caused the loss of power. 
While the fire was eventually self-extinguished, the failure of the installed CO2 
system and the poor execution of the firefighting plan contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the crew’s firefighting effort. 
 
https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?channelId=-
18374&contentId=460088&programId=21431&programPage=%2Fep%2Fpro
gram%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=13489&contentType=EDITORIAL 
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5 RMS Queen 
Mary 2 
9241061 United 
Kingdom 
Lloyds’ 
Register 
Fire  At 0425 on 23 September 2010, as RMS Queen Mary 2 (QM2) was 
approaching Barcelona, an explosion occurred in the vessel’s aft main 
switchboard room. Within a few seconds, all four propulsion motors shut down, 
and the vessel blacked out shortly afterwards. Fortunately, the vessel was 
clear of navigational hazards and drifted in open sea. The emergency 
generator started automatically and provided essential supplies to the vessel, 
and it was quickly established that the explosion had taken place in the aft 
harmonic filter (HF) room, situated within the aft main switchboard. The aft 
main switchboard was isolated, main generators were restarted and the ship 
was able to resume passage at 0523, subsequently berthing in Barcelona at 
about 0900. No one was injured. The accident caused extensive damage to 
the aft HF and surrounding structure. Two water-mist fire suppression spray 
heads were activated, one in the aft harmonic filter room and the other in the 
aft main switchboard room. The explosion was triggered by deterioration in the 
capacitors in the aft HF. Internal arcing between the capacitor plates 
developed, which vaporised the dielectric medium causing the internal 
pressure to increase, until it caused the capacitor casing to rupture. Dielectric 
fluid vapour sprayed out, igniting and creating the likely conditions for an arc-
flash to occur between the 11000 volt bus bars that fed power to the aft HF. A 
current imbalance detection system, which was the only means to warn 
against capacitor deterioration, was found to be inoperable, and it was evident 
that it had not worked for several years. 
 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/QM2Report.pdf 
6 M.V. Royal 
Princess 
9210220 Bermuda NA Fire  In the evening of 18th of June 2009, a few minutes before 20:00 hours Royal 
Princess departed from Port Said, Egypt having spent the day alongside there 
as a planned call on her cruise itinerary. On board were 733 passengers and 
a crew of 393 giving total number of persons on board of 1126. As the vessel 
passed between the breakwaters leaving Port Said a fire broke out on diesel 
generator No4. This unit and unit No. 2 were both in operation providing power 
for the ship. A number of alarm conditions alerted the automation system of a 
pending loss of power from No.4 and diesel generator No.1 started 
automatically and took up the electrical load in conjunction with No. 2. 
Propulsion was maintained and the Captain made for the first available 
anchorage. Crew fire parties were mustered and an attempt was made to enter 
the engine room but the team were beaten back by smoke and heat. 
Passengers were called to muster stations and looked after there by the 
passenger services teams. A decision to tackle the fire with the CO2 total 
flooding system was quickly made and as soon as the vessel was in a position 
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to anchor the engine room was sealed, machinery stopped and CO2 injected. 
Boundary cooling was maintained where necessary and temperatures were 
seen to reduce quite quickly after the CO2 injection. Passengers were held at 
muster stations until just after midnight when they were allowed more freedom 
to access open decks in view of the heat in muster stations in June in Egypt 
with no air conditioning and limited ventilation. At about 0041 hours an entry 
was made to the engine room which confirmed that the fire was extinguished 
and shortly afterwards passengers were allowed to return to their cabins to 
rest. 
 
http://www.bermudashipping.bm 
 
7 M.V. Star 
Princess 
9192363 Bermuda RINA Fire  At 0309 (UTC+5) on 23 March 2006, a fire was detected on board the cruise 
ship Star Princess. The ship was on passage from Grand Cayman to Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, with 2690 passengers and 1123 crew on board. The fire was 
investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) on behalf of 
the Bermuda Maritime Administration, in co-operation with the United States 
Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States’ National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB). The fire started on an external stateroom balcony sited on deck 
10 in the centre of main vertical zone 3, on the vessel’s port side. It was 
probably caused by a discarded cigarette end heating combustible materials 
on a balcony, which smoldered for about 20 minutes before flames developed. 
Once established, the fire spread rapidly along adjacent balconies and, 
assisted by a strong wind over the deck, it spread up to decks 11 &12 and onto 
stateroom balconies in fire zones 3 and 4 within 6 minutes. After a further 24 
minutes, it had spread to zone 5. The fire also spread into the staterooms as 
the heat of the fire shattered the glass in stateroom balcony doors, but was 
contained by each stateroom’s fixed fire-smothering system, the restricted 
combustibility of their contents, and their thermal boundaries. As the fire 
progressed, large amounts of dense black smoke were generated from the 
combustible materials on the balconies, and the balcony partitions. This smoke 
entered the adjacent staterooms and alleyways, and hampered the evacuation 
of the passengers, particularly on deck 12. One passenger died as a result of 
smoke inhalation, and 13 others were treated for the effects of the smoke. 
 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/star%20princess.pdf 
 
8 M.V. The 
Calypso 
NA Cyprus Lloyds’ 
Register 
Fire  At 0330 ship’s time on 6 May 2006, the Cypriot registered cruise ship The 
Calypso suffered an engine room fire while on passage from Tilbury to St. 
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Peter Port, Guernsey, with 708 passengers and crew on board. Initial action 
by the watch keeping engineer officer was effective in eventually extinguishing 
the fire although the vessel lost all but emergency electrical power and was 
left drifting in the south-west lane of the Dover Straits Traffic Separation 
Scheme (TSS), 16 miles south of Beachy Head. The vessel’s starboard main 
engine had been very seriously damaged and she was towed to the port of 
Southampton by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s (MCA) emergency 
towing vessel Anglian Monarch. 
 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007/calypso.cfm?
view=print& 
9 M.V. Saga 
Sapphire 
7822457 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Flooding  On 06 January 2013, at 0050 (UTC), Saga Sapphire experienced a flooding in 
a number of forward compartments during a ballast operation, while in the 
English Channel on passage from El Ferrol to Southampton. The flooding 
effected deck no. 6 forward (Hotel Store Compartment), deck no. 5 forward 
(Hotel Carpenters’ Workshop Area) and the bow thruster space. The flooding, 
which reduced the vessel’s GM height by 34 cm, was discovered at 0038 
(UTC) during a fire patrol. The ingress of water also damaged the bow thruster 
motor. There were no reported injuries or pollution. The direct cause of the 
flooding was a crack, which developed in the vent / overflow pipe during the 
ballasting of deep tank no. 1, which was being conducted without adequate 
supervision. The safety investigation also found less than adequate watch 
handover procedures. Moreover, the rubber seal of the watertight cover to the 
bow thruster flat was damaged. As a result of the safety investigation, the 
MSIU has issued one recommendation aimed to enhance the vessel’s safe 
ballast operations. 
 
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2014.aspx 
10 M.V. Lauren L 9246827 Malta Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding  On 01 April 2012, at 1318 (LT), the passenger vessel Lauren L sailed from La 
Digue to Praslin in Seychelles. The intention was to seek a sheltered 
anchorage on the north-west side of Praslin, where it would have been 
possible to land the passengers with the vessel’s tenders onto an appropriate 
beach. After transiting the Baie Curieuse Channel, Lauren L headed west past 
the northern coast of Praslin. Approaching the planned anchoring position on 
a roughly south westerly heading, the vessel ran aground at 1435 on a rock 
pinnacle charted as an isolated danger at a depth of 1.7 m. Lauren L was 
refloated at 1820. An inspection revealed that the damage was confined to the 
bow thruster compartment and in way of the grey water tank. The safety 
investigation concluded that bridge navigational equipment, in particular the 
 98 
 
ECDIS, was not utilised to its full potential. There were also shortcomings in 
the bridge team composition. MSIU has issued three recommendations to the 
company designed to address the navigational procedures and practices on 
board and the use of VDR data. 
 
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2013.aspx 
11 M.V. Clipper 
Adventure 
NA Bahamas NA Grounding  Upon departure from Port Epworth, the Clipper Adventurer followed the 
planned course along a single line of soundings at 13.9 knots. The chief officer 
who was in charge of the watch monitored the vessel’s progress using parallel 
indexing on the starboard radar and monitored the water depth on the echo-
sounder. The master monitored the portside radar when on the bridge. Once 
clear of Port Epworth and on course 300°gyro, the vessel was placed on 
autopilot and proceeded at 13.9 12F12F 13 knots. The quartermaster 
remained on the bridge, to take over the steering when required. Shortly after 
departing Port Epworth, the chief officer marked a depth of 66 m on the chart 
in an area near where the chart indicated a depth of 40 m. At 1832, the vessel 
ran aground on a shoal in position 67°58.2' N and 112°40.3' W and listed 5 ° 
to port. The vessel grounded on hard rock shelf from approximately the 
forepeak to amidships. This was a previously reported shoal not marked on 
the chart in use. 
 
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/marine/2010/m10h0006/m10h0006.asp 
12 M.V. 
Deutschland 
9141807 Germany Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding The passenger ship DEUTSCHLAND was on a cruise through the group of 
islands off southern Chile and reached the Italia Glacier in the northern arm of 
the Beagle Channel on Sunday 15 January 2012 at about 2300. The master, 
an officer on watch, a helmsman and a pilot were on the bridge. A few minutes 
before reaching the glacier, the ship’s command asked the pilot if it would be 
acceptable to sail closer to the glacier than planned so as to provide 
passengers with the best possible view of this area. The pilot responded with 
a decision to reduce the speed and sail much closer to the glacier. The 
DEUTSCHLAND grounded on her starboard side as she was turning back 
towards the middle of the fjord two cables away from the coastline. The engine 
was stopped immediately and instructions to establish the damage to the ship 
were given. It was possible to move the ship back in the direction of the middle 
of the fjord by means of various engine and helm manoeuvres a short time 
later and continue the voyage to the next port. Damage to the ship or 
environment was not found. 
 
 99 
 
http://www.bsu-bund.de 
13 M.V. Van 
Gogh 
7359400 Marshall 
Island 
Det Norske 
Veritas 
Grounding At about 1817 on 23 February 2008, the Marshall Islands registered passenger 
ship Van Gogh grounded briefly on the western shore of the Mersey River 
during a departure from Devonport, Tasmania. The ship was under the 
conduct of a harbour pilot who had taken over the conduct from the master 
about five minutes before, after the master had manoeuvred the ship off the 
berth. As the ship left the berth, it began to be set towards the bulk carrier 
Goliath berthed ahead. Van Gogh was under the influence of the ebb tide and 
fresh water that was flowing from the Mersey River’s catchment following 
heavy rain in the area in the previous 24 hours. Van Gogh was difficult to 
manoeuvre at low speed because of its twin propellers and single rudder 
configuration. This, combined with the strong ebb tide and fresh water outflow 
in the river at the time of departure, resulted in there being insufficient water 
flow over its rudder to enable the pilot to manoeuvre the ship as he intended. 
In addition, the master did not inform the pilot that the crew would be using the 
ship’s engines independently during turns in the river. This resulted in the pilot 
being concerned that his orders were being countermanded because he saw 
that the engine telegraph levers were not as he had ordered. Following the 
grounding, the pilot successfully manoeuvred the ship back into the channel 
and the ship departed the port without further incident. There was no damage 
to the ship and no pollution resulted. The report identifies a number of safety 
issues and acknowledges the safety actions which have been taken by Club 
Cruise International and the Tasmanian Ports Corporation to address them. 
 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/mair/pdf/mair
252_001.pdf 
14 M.V. Astor 8506373 Bahamas Germanischer 
Lloyds 
Grounding  At 1900 on 26 February 2004, the Bahamas registered passenger ship Astor 
let go its mooring lines and departed the Queensland port of Townsville. The 
ship, equipped with twin rudders, controllable pitch main propellers and a 
single bow thruster, did not require a tug for the departure. The master, as is 
common practice on passenger ships, manoeuvred the ship clear of the berth 
and then, even though this was his first visit to Townsville, kept the conduct of 
the ship without consulting the harbour pilot. The pilot adopted an advisory 
role. As the ship was turning from the harbour into Platypus Channel, part of 
the approach channel to the port, it grounded on its port side. The ship heeled 
three degrees to starboard and, after about three minutes, slid clear of the 
bank without assistance and continued out of the channel. 
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http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/mair/mair200.
aspx 
15 M.V. Monarch 
of the Seas 
8819500 Norway Det Norske 
Veritas 
Grounding  At approximately 0030 hours on the night of 15 December 1998, the passenger 
vessel MONARCH OF THE SEAS arrived outside of Great Bay, St. Maarten 
in order to evacuate a sick passenger to a shore side medical facility. At 0125 
the vessel’s crew completed the passenger evacuation evolution and the 
MONARCH OF THE SEAS departed St. Maarten, taking a South-
Southeasterly departure route with the intention of safely passing to the east 
of the Proselyte reef obstruction. At approximately 0130 hours the MONARCH 
OF THE SEAS raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate speed of about 12 
knots without becoming permanently stranded. Almost immediately 
emergency and abandon ship signals were sounded and the crew and 
passengers were mustered at their abandon ship stations. At 0235 the vessel 
was intentionally grounded on a sandbar in Great Bay, St. Maarten. By 0515 
hours all 2,557 passengers were safely evacuated ashore by shore based 
tender vessels. 
 
http://marinecasualty.com/documents/monarch.pdf 
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Appendix 2: SEMOMAP code book 
SEMOMAP Draft Codebook 
1. Overview of SEMOMAP 
SEMOMAP is a primarily sequential accident investigation model developed for the maritime 
industry. The original framework, developed by Schröder (2003) as a part of his PhD thesis, is 
shown below:   
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Fig. 1 – The ‘Original’ SEMOMAP model 
The idea behind this original model was that an accident can be depicted via a series of 
sequential steps and crucial phases. Building on this idea, a revamped SEMOMAP model – 
SEMOMAP v2 – was developed, as shown in Fig. 2 on the following page.  
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Fig. 2 – The revamped SEMOMAP model – SEMOMAP v2 
 
Before beginning the analysis of an accident through SEMOMAP, some general data needs to 
be collated. The taxonomy of the information that needs to be gathered is provided in section 
2; it consists of fields such as the ship name, IMO Number, and type and severity of incident. 
The information collected via this taxonomy can allow users to compare how accidents differ 
(if at all), based on factors such as type of ship, type of incident, and ship size. If the right data 
and information is available, users can also do further analyses – such a comparing the safety 
records of ships classified by different class societies or that of ships having different flag 
states.    
Having collected some basic background information, one can then use the SEMOMAP model. 
The ‘new’ SEMOMAP v2 consists of 4 different phases. The ‘first’ phase is called ‘Phase 0’. This 
phase identifies all the ‘Contributory Factors’ that contributed indirectly in a way that led to a 
risk of an accident happening – but did not contribute to the accident itself. In other words, 
the factors described in this phase led to the creation of a dangerous situation, but did not 
directly cause any consequences per se. The taxonomy for ‘Phase 0’ is adapted from HFACS – 
the Human Factors Analysis & Classification System, and was originally used for a paper 
published by Schröder-Hinrichs, et al. (2011) titled ‘Accident investigation reporting 
deficiencies related to organizational factors in machinery space fires and explosions’.  The 
taxonomy for phase 0 is presented in section 3 of this codebook. A person using SEMOMAP 
identifies various subjects (human and technical) from the accident report, and then using the 
HFACS taxonomy, describes factors that influenced that subject and contributed to the 
creation of a dangerous situation.  
If the factors mentioned in ‘Phase 0’ are resolved in time, the vessel can return to normal 
operation; if this is not the case however, the accident progresses to the next 3 phases of 
SEMOMAP. The second, third, and fourth phases of SEMOMAP are called ‘Phase 1’, ‘Phase 2’, 
and ‘Phase 3’ respectively.  
‘Phase 1’ is the ‘Beginning Accident’ phase. At this point, the subjects in the system – and by 
extension, the system itself – have been affected by the factors identified in ‘Phase 0’. This 
means that the system is facing an imminent risk of an incident, but still, the accident itself 
has not come to pass. ‘Phase 1’ could indicate, for example, a vessel turning on to collision or 
grounding route due to some factors as identified in ‘Phase 0’ – but would not cover the 
collision or grounding itself. At this stage then, there is still a possibility to avoid the accident 
through correct threat indication, detection, analysis, and correct threat prevention action. If 
the correct steps are followed, the vessel can return to safe operations, with the incident 
classed as a ‘near-miss’. 
If however, the situation remains unchanged, the timeline moves into ‘Phase 2’ – i.e. – ‘The 
Accident’ phase. As the name implies, this phase starts the moment the vessel experiences an 
accident. At this stage, there is a possibility to prevent the accident from escalating any 
further, through appropriate system health indication, detection, analysis, and appropriate 
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emergency response measures. If the appropriate measures are undertaken, depending on 
the severity, the vessel can either suffer a ‘mitigated loss’ or a ‘severe loss’. Mitigated loss 
would indicate that the vessel has suffered damage, but can port unassisted; a severe loss 
indicates a large enough damage that the ship cannot port unassisted.  
If, by the end of Phase 2, the damage is not contained, it is possible that the situation escalates 
further into the very last, critical phase – ‘Phase 3’ – a.k.a. – ‘Evacuation’. In this phase, as the 
name implies, the best course of action is to evacuate and abandon the vessel. However, 
emergency response measures may also continue to fight for increased evacuation time. In 
this phase the priority is on the emergency and evacuations actions; system health indication, 
detection and analysis may also continue to monitor the developments.  
All 3 latter phases – Phases 1, 2, and 3 – have 4 types of steps: an ‘indication’ step, a ‘detection’ 
step, an ‘analysis’ step, and an ‘action’ step. These steps and their ‘common’ taxonomies are 
discussed further in section 4. Each step has multiple ‘levels’ of information that can be filled 
in, to provide more details that describe the accident. The taxonomies of these ‘levels’ are also 
discussed in section 4.  
 
Fig. 3 – The steps of SEMOMAP 
The reader may also note that it is possible to ‘loop around’ or have ‘iterations’, as shown in 
Fig. 2. In each ‘loop’ or ‘iteration’ there can only be one (or none) ‘indication’, ‘detection’, and 
‘analysis’ – but more than one ‘action’ is possible. Each phase, can of course, have multiple 
iterations. It is also possible for an iteration to change the actual type of accident, or risk of 
accident that a vessel faces.  
This is because maritime accidents can be very complex, and a risk or an accident of one type 
can quickly evolve into another type. In fact, according to Vassalos (2009), the following 
possible links are possible between different types of accidents:  
The four types of steps, as shown 
for ‘Phase 2’ of SEMOMAP 
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Fig. 4 – Possible accident evolutions. Source: Vassalos (2009) 
2. Taxonomy for General Information 
Taxonomy Category Description 
IMO Number  State the IMO number of the ship 
Vessel Name State ship name and its previous name 
Vessel type Classify the type of ship by its functionality to carry its 
cargo: GC, Container, Bulk Carrier, Tanker, Passenger, Ro-
Ro, Others 
Vessel Flag State State ship flag at the time of the accident 
Classification Society State the class society the ship was classified under at the 
time of the accident 
Keel Laid Year State the keel laid year as indicated in ship certificate 
Built at State the location (shipyard, country) the ship built 
Deadweight Ton (DWT) DWT of the ship 
Ship Length Over All (m) Overall length of the ship 
Ship Beam (m) State ship breadth 
Ship Loaded Draft (m) State the ship draft at the time of the occurrence 
Ship Height (m) state the vertical measure of ship bottom to the upmost 
deck 
Date of Occurrence State date of occurrence 
Time of Occurrence State time of occurrence by Local time and GMT  
Geographical Occurrence 
Location 
State the location of the occurrence by its fix gps position 
and other geographical reference 
Type of Occurrence Classify nature of accident with following event: Collision, 
Grounding, Contact, Fire/explosion, Hull failure, Loss of 
control, Ship/equipment damage, Capsize/listing, 
Flooding/foundering, Ship Missing, Occupational accident, 
Others, Unknown 
Number of Fatalities / 
Injuries 
State number of the fatalities as a result of the accident at 
the point and subsequent fatality, 
Consequence to the Ship Provide sufficient information of the end consequences to 
the ship due to accident, 
Narratives Brief overview of the occurrence 
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3. Taxonomy for Phase 0 
As mentioned earlier, the taxonomy for Phase 0 was adapted from HFACS. This section 
breaks down the HFACS taxonomy, and provides descriptions of what each option. The 
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP consists of 4 levels; for brevity, however, the taxonomy 
definitions provided in the codebook are only for levels 1, 2 and 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Influence
Resource 
Management
Organisational 
Climate
Organisational 
Process
Statutory factor
Supervision
Inadequate 
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems
Supervisory 
Violations
Preconditions
Environmental 
Factors
Crew Condition Personnel Factors
Unsafe Acts
Errors Violations
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Level-1 Taxonomy 
Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Influence 
factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or 
policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect 
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the operator(s) and 
result in system failure, human error or an unsafe situation 
Supervision a mishap event can often be traced back to the supervisory chain of 
command. 
Pre-Condition factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as 
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect 
practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error 
or an unsafe situation 
Unsafe Acts  
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Level-2 Taxonomy  
Taxonomy under Organisational influence 
 
 
Parent Level L-2 Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Influence 
Resource 
Management 
factor in a mishap if resource management and/or 
acquisition processes or policies, directly or 
indirectly, influence system safety and results in poor 
error management or creates an unsafe situation 
Organisational 
Climate 
Factor in a mishap if organizational variables 
including environment, structure, policies, and 
culture influence individual actions and results in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
Organisational 
Process 
Factor in a mishap if organizational processes such as 
operations, procedures, operational risk 
management and oversight negatively influence 
individual, supervisory, and/or organizational 
performance and results in unrecognized hazards 
and/or uncontrolled risk and leads to human error or 
an unsafe situation 
Statutory factors Considered as external factor that mostly on the 
policy and regulatory side 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Influence
Resource 
Management
Organisational 
Climate
Organisational 
Process
Statutory factor
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Taxonomy under supervision 
 
 
Parent Level L-2 Terminology Definition 
Supervision Inadequate 
supervision 
factor in a mishap when supervision proves 
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify a 
hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance, 
training and/or oversight and results in human error 
or an unsafe situation 
Planned 
inappropriate 
operation 
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to 
adequately assess the hazards associated with an 
operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is also a 
factor when supervision allows non-proficient or 
inexperienced personnel to attempt missions beyond 
their capability or when crew or flight makeup is 
inappropriate for the task or mission. 
Failure in 
correct known 
problem 
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct 
known deficiencies in documents, processes or 
procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or 
unsafe actions of individuals, and this lack of 
supervisory action creates an unsafe situation. 
Supervisory 
violation 
factor in a mishap when supervision, while managing 
organizational assets, wilfully disregards instructions, 
guidance, rules, or operating instructions and this 
lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe 
situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervision
Inadequate 
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems
Supervisory 
Violations
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Taxonomy under Precondition 
 
Parent Level Terminology Definition 
Pre Condition  Condition of 
Individual 
Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural, 
adverse physical state, or physical/mental limitations 
affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals 
and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
Environmental 
Factor 
factors in a mishap if physical or technological factors 
affect practices, conditions and actions of individual 
and result in human error or an unsafe situation 
Personal Factor factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew 
resource management affects practices, conditions 
or actions of individuals, and result in human error or 
an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preconditions
Environmental 
Factors
Crew Condition Personnel Factors
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Taxonomy under Unsafe Acts 
 
Parent Level Terminology Definition 
Unsafe Acts Errors Factors in a mishap when mental or physical activities 
of the operator fail to achieve their intended 
outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or 
judgment and decision making errors, leading to an 
unsafe situation 
Violations Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator 
represent wilful disregard for rules and instructions 
and lead to an unsafe situation. Unlike errors, 
violations are deliberate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unsafe Acts
Errors Violations
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Level-3 Taxonomy 
Taxonomy under Resource Management (under Organisational Influence) 
 
Parent Level Terminology Definition 
Resource 
Management 
Lack of human 
resource 
Issues that directly influence safety include 
selection (including background checks), 
training, and staffing/manning 
Poor technological 
resources 
Are factors in a mishap when ship design 
factors or automation affect the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation 
Poor 
equipment/facility 
issues related to equipment design, including 
the purchasing of unsuitable equipment, 
inadequate design of workspaces, and failures 
to correct known design flaws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource 
Management
Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
Poor Technological 
Resources
Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
 Inadequate safe  
manning
 Selection
 Training
 Excessive cost cutting
 Financial resources/  
support
 Engineer support
 Acquisition policies/  
design process
 Attrition policies
 Accession/  selection 
policies
 Poor engine-room 
design
 Poor engine-room 
machinery design
 Purchasing of 
unsuitable equipment
 Failure to correct 
known design flaws
 Shortage of tools
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Taxonomy under Organisational Climate (under Organisational Influence) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
organizational 
climate 
Disorganised 
Structure 
a factor when the chain of command of an 
individual or structure of an organization is 
confusing, non-standard or inadequate and this 
creates an unsafe situation 
Inadequate 
Policies 
A course or method of action that guides present 
and future decisions. Policies may refer to hiring 
and firing, promotion, retention, raises, sick leave, 
drugs and alcohol, overtime, accident 
investigations, use of safety, equipment, etc. When 
these policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or 
conflicting, safety may be reduced 
Poor Work 
Culture 
a factor when explicit/implicit actions, statements  
or attitudes of unit leadership set 
unit/organizational values (culture) that allow an  
environment where unsafe mission demands or 
pressures exist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Climate
Disorganised Struct ure Policies Poor Work Culture
 Chain-of-command
 Communication
 Accessibil ity/  visibilit y 
of supervisor
 Delegation of 
aut hor ity/  rigidity
 Formal  accountabil ity 
for actions
 Promot ion
 Hiring, firing and 
retention
 Drugs and alcohol
 Accident and incident 
investigation
 Norms and rules
 Organisat ional 
customs, beliefs and 
at titudes
 Safety as a value
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Taxonomy under Organisational Process (under Organisational Influence) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Process 
Poorly designed 
operation 
a factor when the potential risks of a large program, 
operation, acquisition or process are not adequately 
assessed and this inadequacy leads to an unsafe 
situation. 
Inappropriate 
procedures 
a factor when written direction, checklists, graphic 
depictions, tables, charts or other published 
guidance is inadequate, misleading or inappropriate 
and this creates an unsafe situation 
Lack of oversight a factor when programs are implemented without 
sufficient support, oversight or planning and this 
leads to an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Process
Poorly Designed 
Operat ion
Inappropriat e 
Procedures
Lack of Oversight
 Operat ional tempo/
workload
 Incentives
 Time pressure
 Schedules
 Performance 
standards
 Clearly defined 
objectives
 Procedural guidance/  
publicat ions
 Informational 
resources/  suppor t
 Doctrine
 Established safety 
programmes/  risk 
management 
programmes
 Monitoring and 
checking of 
resources, climate 
and processes to 
ensure safe work 
environment
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Taxonomy under Statutory Factor (under Organisational Influence) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Statutory 
factor 
Poor 
international/national 
standards 
national or international standards that led to poor 
conditions and a dangerous situation 
Inadequate flag state 
implementation 
the flag state procedures were inadequate and led 
to a dangerous situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory factor
Poor International/
Nat ional Standards
Inadequate Flag State 
Implement ation
 Rule-making process
 Regulations
 Link with vessel/  
company
 Delegation of 
aut hor ity to RO
 Class and statutory 
surveys
 Communication
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Taxonomy under Inadequate Supervision (under Supervision) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Poor shipborne 
and shore 
supervision 
a factor when the availability, competency, quality or 
timeliness of leadership, supervision or oversight does 
not meet task demands and creates an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate Supervision
 Poor Shipborne and Shore Supervision
 Leadership/  supervision/  oversight 
inadequate
 Supervision - modelling
 Local training issues/ programmes
 Supervision - policy
 Supervision - personality conflict
 Supervision - lack of feedback
 Failed to provide current public/  adequate 
technical dat a or procedures
 Failed to provide adequate rest period
 Lack of accountabili ty
 Perceived lack of aut hor ity
 Failed to track quali fications
 Failed to track performance
 Over-tasked/ untrained officer at 
management level
 Loss of supervisory situational awareness
 Lack of communication with company 
representat ives
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Taxonomy under Planned Inappropriate Operations (under Supervision) 
 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition  
Planned 
inappropriate 
operations 
Poor shipborne 
operations 
a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to 
adequately assess the hazards associated with an 
operation and allows for unnecessary risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations
 Poor Shipborne Operat ions
 Ordered/ led maintenance beyond capability
 Poor crew interaction
 Limited recent experience
 Limited t ot al experience
 Proficiency
 Lack of risk assessment - formal
 Author ised unnecessary hazard
 Failed to provide adequate brief time /  
supervision
 Failed to provide adequate opportunity for crew 
rest
 Excessive tasking/ loading
 118 
 
Taxonomy under Failed to Correct Problems (under Supervision) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Failed to 
correct known 
problems 
Shipborne related 
shortcomings 
a factor when the supervisor selects an individual 
who’s experience for either a specific manoeuvre, 
event or scenario is not sufficiently current to permit 
safe mission execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failed to Correct Known Problems
 Shipborne Related Shortcomings
 Failed to correct inappropr iate/ risky 
behaviour
 Failed to correct a safety hazard
 Failed to initiate corrective action
 Failed to report unsafe tendencies
 Failed to update manual
 Parts /  tools incorrectly labeled
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Taxonomy under Supervisory Violations (under Supervision) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Supervisory 
violations 
Shipborne 
violations 
Violations on board the ship that led to the creation of 
a dangerous situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisory Viola tions
 Shipborne Violations
 Engaged unqual ified crew
 Failed to enforce rules/ regs
 Violated procedures
 Wil lful  disregard of aut hor ity
 Inadequate documentation
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Taxonomy under Environmental Factors (under Preconditions) 
 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Environmental 
factors 
Poor physical 
environmental 
Physical environment are factors in a mishap if 
environmental phenomena such as weather, climate, 
white-out or dust-out conditions affect the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe 
situation 
Poor 
technological 
environment 
Technological environment are factors in a mishap 
when cockpit/vehicle/workspace design factors or 
automation affect the actions of individuals and result 
in human error or an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmenta l Factors
Poor Physical Environment Poor Technological Environment
 Temperature - thermal stress
 Artificial  light
 Vibration
 Ship movements and manoeuvres
 Toxins and cleanliness in machinery 
space
 Noise inter ference
 Controls and switches
 Automation
 Machinery space layout
 Communication equipment
 Barriers
 Faulty equipment
 Const rained tool use
 Complex faul t
 Inaccessible maintenance area
 Machinery space configuration variabi lity
 Parts unavai lable
 Parts incorrect ly labeled
 Easy to instal l incorrectly
 Machinery space system knowledge
 Procedure not understandable
 Procedure unavailable/  inaccessible
 Incorrect procedure
 Too much/  conflicting information
 Process/  procedure update not carried out
 Incorrectly modified manufacturer's 
procedures
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Taxonomy under Crew Condition (under Preconditions) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Crew 
condition 
Negative 
cognitive factors 
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention 
management conditions affect the perception or 
performance of individuals and result inhuman error or 
an unsafe situation 
Poor physiological 
state 
Are factors when an individual’s personality traits, 
psychosocial problems, psychological disorders or 
inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crew Condition
Negative Cognitive Factors Poor Physiological State
 Inattention, repet itive and monotonous
 Channelised at tention
 Confusion
 Distraction
 Checklist interference
 Emotional  st ate
 Personality style
 Overconfidence
 Pressing
 Complacency
 Overagressive
 Excessive motivation to succeed
 Get-there-itis
 Response set
 Burnout
 Fatigue - mental
 Circadian rhythm desynchrony
 Misperception of operational condition
 Misinterpreted/ misread instrument
 Expectancy
 Auditory cues
 Other cues
 Alert ness (drowsiness)
 Peer pressure
 Technical/procedural knowledge
 Negative transfer
 Effects of PoM and OTC (Medicinal 
Drugs)
 Operat ional injury/ illness
 Sudden incapacitation/  
unconsciousness
 Physical fatigue
 Seasickness
 Hypoxia
 Hyperventilat ion
 Dehydration
 Physical t ask oversaturation
 Intoxication
 Nutrit ion
 Inadequate rest
 Unreported disqualified medical  
condition
 Overexcertion while off duty
 Misplaced motivation
 Inadequate mot ivation
 Pre-exist ing physical  illness/  injury/  
deficient
 Motor skill/  coordinat ion or timing 
deficient
 Insufficient reaction time
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Taxonomy under Personnel Factors (under Preconditions) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Personnel 
factors 
Poor crew 
interaction 
Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and 
teams involved with the preparation and  
execution of a mission that resulted in human error or 
an unsafe situation 
Poor personal 
readiness 
factors in a mishap if the operator demonstrates 
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the 
individuals readiness to perform, or exhibits poor 
judgment when it comes to readiness and results in 
human error or an unsafe situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personnel Factors
Poor Crew Interact ion Poor Personal Readiness
 Machinery space leadership
 Cross-monit or ing 
performance
 Team work delegation
 Rank gradient/power distance
 Asser tiveness
 Communicating critical 
information
 Challenge and reply
 Maint enance plan
 Maint enance plan briefing
 Task-in-progress re- planning
 Miscommunication
 Inadequate t raining
 Maint enance task knowledge
 Time constraints
 Patt ern of poor r isk judgment
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Taxonomy under Errors (under Unsafe Acts) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Errors Skilled based 
errors 
Are factors in a mishap when errors occur in the 
operator’s execution of a routine, highly  
practiced task relating to procedure, training or 
proficiency and result in an unsafe a situation 
Decision and 
judgement errors 
Are factors in a mishap when behaviour or actions of 
the individual proceed as intended yet the  
chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired 
end-state and results in an unsafe situation 
Perceptual errors Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an 
object, threat or situation, (such as visual,  
auditory, pro prioceptive, or vestibular illusions, 
cognitive or attention failures, etc), results in  
human error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Errors
Skill-based errors Decision and judgement 
errors
Perceptual errors
 Inadver tent  use of 
equipment , control and 
swit ches
 Task overloadFailure t o 
see and avoid
 Distraction
 Poor techniques/
seamanshipOver/
under-control of the 
system
 Over-reliance on 
aut omation
 Negative habit
 Checklist error
 Omitted step in 
procedure
 Procedures not used
 Failed to priorit ise 
at tention
 Risk assessment during 
operation
 Task misprior itisation
 Necessary action – 
rushed
 Necessary action – 
delayed
 Warning ignored
 Wrong decision making 
during operation
 Error due to 
misperception
 Error due to misjudged 
parameters
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Taxonomy under Violations (under Unsafe Acts) 
 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Violations Routine a factor when a procedure or policy violation is 
systemic in a unit/setting and not based on a risk 
assessment for a specific situation. It needlessly 
commits the individual, team, or crew to an unsafe 
course-of-action. These violations may have leadership 
sanction and may not routinely result in 
disciplinary/administrative action. Habitual violations 
of a single individual or small group of individuals 
within a unit can constitute a routine/widespread 
violation if the violation was not routinely disciplined or 
was condoned by supervisors 
Exceptional a factor when an individual, crew or team intentionally 
violates procedures or policies without cause or need. 
These violations are unusual or isolated to specific 
individuals rather than larger groups. There is no 
evidence of these violations being condoned by 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Violations
Routine Exceptional
 Violation based on risk 
assessment
 Inadequate br iefing for job
 Operat ed when 
unauthorised
 Violated training rules
 Failed to comply wit h 
manuals
 Violated st anding orders 
and regs
 Failed to inspect after  
alarm
 Exceeded l imits of system
 Accepted unnecessary 
hazards
 Not qual ified
 Unauthorised to operate 
beyond design cr iter ia
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‘Taxonomy of Subjects Affected by Contributory Factors  
It was mentioned earlier that it is important to identify the subjects that are influenced by 
the contributory factors. Following is a tabulated list of subjects. Note that this list is by no 
means exhaustible. Each of the subjects is self-explanatory.  
Category of Subject Sub-Category Subject 
Human Subjects Captain & Officers Captain 
1st/Chief Officer 
2nd Officer 
3rd Officer 
Other Officer 
Navigators Helmsman 
Pilot 
Other Crew AB 
Bosun 
OS 
Engineers 1st/Chief Engineer 
2nd Engineer 
Other Engineer 
Technical Subjects Bridge & Deck Steering Equipment 
Navigation Aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar, 
GPS, etc…) 
Communication Equipment 
Alarm Panels & System 
Engine Room Main Engine 
Auxiliary Engine 
Engine Control Panel 
Fuel Pumps 
Ballast Water Pumps 
Generators 
Boilers 
Ship Structure & 
Design 
Hull 
Separators 
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4. Taxonomy for Phases 1 – 3 
Phases 1, 2 and 3, as mentioned earlier, each consist of 4 types of steps. At each step, 
several levels of information can be filled in – in a given order. The section details the order 
in which information is filled in, and provides taxonomies for each of the 4 different steps.  
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not:
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a
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o
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Threat Indication
Which specific threat indicator, based on the dangerous scenrio, did not function? 
Information Recording Applicable?
Information Recording Successful? If not:
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As shown in the figure on the previous page, filling in a SEMOMAP step during any phase 
consists of up to 7 stages (shown in black circles, numbered 1 to 7).  
1. Determine the Phase 
The phases have been discussed previously in Section 1. It is possible to be in Phase 0, 1, 2 or 
3. This section deals exclusively with Phases 1, 2 and 3.  
2. Determine the  Step (Indication, Detection, Analysis or Action) – Level 1 
If they are in Phase 1, the steps will be [Threat] Indication, [Threat] Detection, [Threat]  
Analysis, and [Threat Prevention] Action 
In Phase 2, the steps will be  [System Health] Indication, [System Health] Detection, [System 
Health] Analysis, and [Emergency Response] Action 
In Phase 3, the steps will be [Emergency Response & Evacuation] Action, [System Health] 
Indication, [System Health] Detection, and [System Health] Analysis  
 
The steps are self-explanatory. An ‘Indication’ step is one where something may be indicated 
by someone or something. A ‘detection’ step is where the indication from an indicator may be 
detected by someone or something. In the ‘analysis’ step, someone or something may 
performs an analysis on what is detected in the previous step. In the ‘action’ step, an action 
may be taken based on the ‘analysis’ step. It is important to note that any of these steps, it is 
possible that nothing is done at all.   
3. Choose a Subject – Level 2 
Depending on stages 1 and 2, as well as the type of risk, or type of accident that the vessel 
faces, the users must choose a subject at this stage that was used for a particular step in a 
particular phase, for a particular type of accident. The type of accident (navigation, on-board, 
entire-vessel constitutes ‘Level 2A’).  
The tables on the following pages show the possible subjects for the various phases, steps, 
and types of incidents. 
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
VTS 
Other 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Radar 
Echo Sounder 
AIS 
ECDIS 
Sea Charts 
GPS 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew 
Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Foghorn 
Lighthouse 
Bouy/Navigation
al Aid 
Other 
Human 
VTS 
Coastguard 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
VTS 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 P
re
ve
n
ti
o
n
 A
ct
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Steering & Manouvering 
Altering Speed 
Dropping Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Other Vessel Alters 
Course 
Other Vessel Alters 
Speed 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure, 
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring 
System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring 
Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW/EOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 A
n
al
ys
is
 Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring 
System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring 
Centre 
Other 
 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 P
re
ve
n
ti
o
n
 A
ct
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Cut off oxygen supply to 
flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Move flammable goods 
to safe place 
Reduce heat 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected 
systems 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding, 
Foundering) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Th
re
at
  
P
re
ve
n
ti
o
n
 a
ct
io
n
 
Onboard 
 
 
 
Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Other 
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Possible Subjects for Phase 2 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Hull Damage Sensors 
List Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
Stability Indicators 
Other 
Human 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
A
ct
io
n
 Onboard Action 
Contain Hull Damage 
Contain Equipment 
Damage 
Drop Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Tug Vessel 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 2 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure, 
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 A
ct
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Fire-fighting 
Sprinkler System 
Muster Crew 
Move flammable goods to 
safe place 
Cut off oxygen supply to 
flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected 
systems 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Fire-fighting vessel 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 2 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding, 
Foundering) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
A
ct
io
n
 Onboard Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Seal Watertight 
Compartments 
Ballast Water Stabilisation 
Other 
Ashore Action 
Tug Vessel 
Other 
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Possible Subjects for Phase 3 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding) 
L2B L2C L2D -L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 E
va
cu
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Contain Hull Damage 
Contain Equipment 
Damage 
Drop Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency 
Response Measure 
Other Evacuation 
Measure 
Offboard Action 
Call Tug Vessel 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Hull Damage Sensors 
List Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
Stability Indicators 
Other 
Human 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 3 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure, 
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 E
va
cu
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Fire-fighting 
Sprinkler System 
Muster Crew 
Move flammable goods 
to safe place 
Cut off oxygen supply to 
flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected 
systems 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency 
Response Measure 
Other Evacuation 
Measure 
Offboard Action 
Call Fire-fighting vessel 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew 
Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring 
System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring 
Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring 
Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring 
System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring 
Centre 
Other 
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Possible subjects for Phase 3 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding, 
Foundering) 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Em
er
ge
n
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 E
va
cu
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Seal Watertight 
Compartments 
Ballast Water 
Stabilisation 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency 
Response Measure 
Other Evacuation 
Measure 
Ashore Action 
Call Tug Vessel 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 In
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Sy
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support 
System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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4. Specify whether the step was Applicable and Successful – Level 3A & 3B 
This stage firstly breaks down each step into smaller ‘sub-steps’, as follows: 
Step Sub-Steps 
Indication Information Recording 
 Information Transmission 
Detection Information Receiving 
 Information Evaluation 
 Information Transmission 
Analysis Information Receiving 
 Planning 
 Decision Making 
Action Communication 
 Timing & Sequence 
 Selection & Quality 
 
Once again, these steps and sub-steps are self-explanatory. 
At this stage, the user must determine whether each sub-step was applicable or not. If it was 
not applicable (for instance, if the threat indicator and detector are the same person and there 
is therefore no transmission or receiving or information; or if there was no threat detection) 
the user does not need to answer any more questions, and can move to the next sub-step or 
step. Alternatively, if a sub-step was applicable, and successful, in that case too, the user can 
move to the next sub-step without going into further stages of the sub-step.  
If, however, a sub-step is applicable, and unsuccessful, the user must answer further 
questions, and moves to stage 5.  
Note here that successful means success in the context of the sub-step – and not in the context 
of the entire accident or incident; a successful action might still be a wrong action in terms of 
the accident, but it was ‘successful’ because in itself, it was done correctly, but may, for 
example, have been based on wrong information from the previous step.  
5. Specify whether Human or Equipment Failure – Level 4A 
If a sub-step was unsuccessful, the user can select in this stage if it was due to human or 
equipment failure.  
6. Specify what the Human or Equipment Failure Was – Level 4B 
In this level, the user gets to specify what the exact human or equipment failure was. It 
depends on the sub-step, and the phase that the user is in. Tables on the following pages show 
the possible failures for each possible sub-step as defined in earlier on this page.  This 
taxonomy is adapted from the TRACEr taxonomy of Kirwan and Shorrock (2002). 
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Possible Failures for Information Recording 
No Information Recorded 
Unclear Information Recorded 
Partial Information Recorded 
Wrong Information Recorded 
Delay in Information Recorded 
Unnecessary Information Recorded 
 
Possible Failures for Information Transmission 
No Information Transmitted 
Unclear Information Transmitted 
Partial Information Transmitted 
Wrong Information Transmitted 
Delay in Information Transmitted 
Unnecessary Information Transmitted 
 
Possible Failures for Information Receiving  
No Information Received 
Unclear Information Received 
Partial Information Received 
Wrong Information Received 
Delay in Information Received 
Unnecessary Information Received 
 
Possible Failures for Information Evaluation 
No Evaluation 
Unclear Evaluation 
Partial Evaluation 
Incorrect Evaluation 
Delayed Evaluation 
 
Possible Failures for Planning 
No Planning 
Unclear Planning 
Partial Planning 
Wrong Planning 
Delay in Planning 
Unnecessary Planning 
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Possible Failures for Decision Making 
No Decision 
Unclear Decision 
Partial Decision 
Wrong Decision 
Delay in Decision 
 
Possible Failures for Communication 
No Action Information Provided/Recorded 
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded 
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded 
Wrong Action  Information Provided/Recorded 
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded 
Unnecessary Action Information 
Provided/Recorded 
 
Possible Failures for Timing & Sequence 
Action too long 
Action too short 
Action too early 
Action too late 
Action repeated 
Action in wrong sequence 
 
Possible Failures for Selection & Quality 
Omission 
Action too much 
Action too little 
Action in wrong direction 
Wrong action on right object 
Right action on wrong object 
Wrong action on wrong object 
Extraneous act 
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7. Specify why the failure occurred – Level 5 
In this level, the user gets to specify why the human or equipment made an error or failed. It 
depends solely on whether a human or technical subject committed a failure, regardless of 
the phase or the step. The taxonomy for this stage too (at least for the human subjects) is 
adapted from TRACEr (Kirwan, Shorrock 2002).  
The following tables show possible internal error modes for human subjects.  
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The following tables show the possible respective psychological error modes, also for human 
subjects.  
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With regards to equipment failures, there is no ‘taxonomy’ per se. However, it is broadly been 
identified that an equipment may cause a failure if it is not installed, if it is turned off, is on the 
wrong settings, suffers from an electric failure, has a poor maintenance record, is out-dated 
technology, has loose connections or unreliable software. Some of these errors too can be 
traced back to human mistakes, but primarily may be considered ‘equipment’ failure causes.  
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